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Colonial Presumptions: The War on Terror and the
Roots of American Exceptionalism
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO*
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, George W.
Bush, the forty-third president of the United States, said in an address to Congress,
"Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists .... This is not, however, just
America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the
world's fight. This is civilization's fight."' The resulting "war on terror," both a
military and an ideological struggle, has evolved into a conflict with neither geographi-
cal boundaries nor a clear definition of victory, and has become a "global enterprise
of uncertain duration."'2 Identified enemies have included Osama bin Laden and the
al Qaeda network, the Taliban government of Afghanistan, the state of Iraq and its
president Saddam Hussein, an "axis of evil" consisting of North Korea and Iran as
well as Iraq, radical Islam, the hundreds of men and boys of several dozen nationali-
ties indefinitely detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, and
select U.S. citizens declared without proffer of evidence to be "enemy combatants."
3
One thing is clear, however: this shape-shifting war is the United States' justification
for the promotion of a "new paradigm" of international law.
4
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1. George W. Bush, Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 23, 2001), in WE WILL
PREVAIL: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ON WAR, TERRORISM, AND FREEDOM 14-15 (National Review ed.,
2003).
2. The White House, Introduction to THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html [hereinafter NSS].
3. On the shifting definitions of the enemies at issue, see Hendrik Hertzberg, War and Words, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213ta-talk_
hertzberg. On the detentions of individuals, see generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and
Transfer in the War Against Terrorism: Guantdnamo and Beyond, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457
(2003).
4. Thus, for example, in a January 25, 2002, memo to the President, White House Counsel and future
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales noted Bush's announcement that "the war against terrorism is a new kind
of war," and stated that "this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of
enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions." Stephen P. Marks, Branding the 'War on Terror-
ism: Is there a 'New Paradigm' of International Law? 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 71, 89 (2006) (quoting
Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to George W. Bush, President, United States of America,
(Jan. 25, 2002). President Bush also referred to this "new paradigm" in a February 7, 2002 memo in which he
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According to President Bush, this new paradigm was "ushered in not by us, but by
terrorists" and "requires new thinking in the law of war." 5 In the years since 2001,
the United States has, in fact, engaged in numerous practices generally recognized to
be at odds with both the laws of war and international law more generally.6 Often
citing other parties' failures to comply with the global rule of the law, U.S. officials
have exempted themselves from adherence to existing norms, sparking debate as to
whether the American stance is simply hypocritical or actually necessitated by the
changing face of global terrorism.7 One way of analyzing this issue is to consider
current arguments proffered in the war on terror in light of the history of the United
States' selective self-exemption from otherwise applicable international law and the
invocation of an exceptional status to justify this practice.8 To the extent that current
policies and their stated rationales comport with a consistent historical pattern, one
.can reasonably conclude that their impetus is not simply a new and imminent threat,
but more deeply rooted.
In this essay I suggest that contemporary American policies and practices are
entirely consonant with the policies that have been implemented throughout U.S.
history, and that the United States has both invoked and exempted itself from
international legal standards since its founding. Furthermore, the reasoning behind
this approach is, I believe, firmly rooted in the arguments, both moral and legal, that
have been utilized for centuries to justify European colonial expansion. If this analy-
sis is accurate, it implies that in order to assess (much less change) contemporary U.S.
practice, we would have to consider not only the current state of world affairs, but
also the validity of the underlying worldview. This, of course, is a project far beyond
the scope of this essay. My purpose here is simply to articulate some of the pre-
* sumptions underlying the rationale for the current war on terror, and to point out
some of the historical parallels to the arguments for American exceptionalism ad-
vanced during the settlement of this continent, the establishment of the American
republic, and several wars waged by the United States.
This essay proceeds as follows: Section I outlines some of the underlying precepts
of the war on terror, noting that these presumptions reflect a paradigm in which
states, "Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm-ushered in not by us but by terrorists-requires new
thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva."
Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, United States of America, to Richard B. Cheney, Vice
President, United States of America, et. al., (Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchivl
NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.02.07.pdf.
5. Marks, supra note 5, at 89 (quoting Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 5, at 1).
6. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Who's Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1082 (2007); Leila Nadya
Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1200, 1247 (2007); Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 303, 303-06 (2002).
8. For more related analyses of American exceptionalism in the context of international law, see Michael
Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1-26 (Michael Ignatieffed., 2005) (breaking the concept down into American exceptional-
ism, legal self-sufficiency, and double standards); Harold Hongju Koh, America 'Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptional-
ism, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 111-43 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (distinguishing four components
which he identifies as distinctive rights, different labels, the "flying buttress" mentality, and double standards).
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Western civilization is the benchmark for human progress, and the United States is
the model of that civilization. Section II summarizes some of the clearest examples of
U.S. practices that have deviated from international norms, as what has been termed
"a distinctly American internationalism" is implemented in the context of the war on
terror.9 Section III briefly considers how the principles, or "values," invoked in the
war on terror informed both the vision and the legal rationales of the 17th century
English settlers as they established the colonies that would become the United States.
Section IV addresses the extension of these presumptions and the arguments for
American exemption from then-prevailing international law as the colonists' justifica-
tion for establishing an independent state in the 18 h century. Select examples of how
these arguments were used in consolidating and expanding the territorial base of the
country in the 1 9 th century are provided in Section V, and Section VI addresses the
extension of the exceptionalist rationale to U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century.
In conclusion, I suggest that if we are to understand contemporary expressions of
American exceptionalism in the war on terror, we must consider not only our recent
history, but also the more fundamental constructs of international law and visions of
"civilization" and human progress upon which the United States has always relied.
I. THE WAR ON TERROR AS A STRUGGLE FOR CIVILIZATION S
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Eitheryou are with us, or you
are with the terrorists .... This is not, however, just America 4fight. And what is af
stake is notjustAmerica 'sfeedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization "sfight.
George W Bush, PresidentialAddress to Congress, September 23, 200110
In assessing the "new paradigm" of international law emerging in the context of
the current war on terror, it is helpful to begin by articulating several of its underlying
presumptions.1 1 There are, of course, many approaches to this project.1 2 Here, I
focus on five premises: the assertion that the enemy in this war is evil; that this evil is
embodied in terrorist individuals and rogue states; that such enemies cannot be
presumed to act rationally and, therefore, the normal rules of combat do not apply;
that what is being defended is civilization, particularly Western civilization, which is
claimed to embody universal values such as freedom and democracy; and that the
United States embodies the highest stage of this civilization and, therefore, should be
the model for the rest of the world.
9. See infra note 34.
10. WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting George W. Bush, Presidential Address to a Joint
Session of Congress (Sept. 23, 2001).
11. In this formulation I am indebted to the late Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.'s explication of the
American jurisprudence of slavery found in The Ten Precepts ofAmerican Slavery Jurisprudence: ChiefJustice
Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1695 (1996); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL
POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996).
12. Antony Anghie, for example, focuses on three primary points: the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense,
the concept of rogue states, and the idea of promoting democracy to transform such entities. See ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (2005).
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The first premise is that the enemy in this war on terror is evil, a term used as both
a noun and as an adjective. Echoing Ronald Reagan's description of the Soviet bloc
as an "evil empire," 3 President Bush said in his June 2002 West Point commence-
ment address that " [w] e are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call
evil by its name."1 4 By framing the struggle in terms of good versus evil, it is much
easier to bypass discussion of the motivations, legitimate or otherwise, that might
prompt attacks against the United States. This construction stifles debate concerning
the morality or legality of actions taken in course of the war for evil is, by definition,
that which must be struggled against.'
5
A second core assertion made by those directing the current war is that the evil
being fought is embodied in terrorism. The Natiokial Security Strategy of the United
States, a 2002 policy report of the Bush administration, defines terrorism as "premedi-
tated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."' 6 Terrorists,
therefore, are the enemy and, according to the Bush administration, "We make no
distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to
them."' 7 This enemy is elusive, unpredictable, and does not play by the rules. It
operates from "shadowy networks," which are "organized to penetrate open societies
13. See Elaine Tyler May, Echoes of the Cold War; The Aftermath of September 11 at Home, in SEPTEMBER
11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 45 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003) ("The clever term 'axis of evil'
fuses the World War II memory of the Axis powers to Ronald Reagan's Cold War description of the Soviet
Union as the 'Evil Empire.'").
14. George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech at the Graduation Exercises of the
United States Military Academy (June 1, 2002), in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 161. For similar
statements, see George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech at the Department of
Defense Service of Remembrance (Oct. 11, 2001) in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 40.
15. As President Bush told a gathering of Federal Bureau of Investigation employees, those who attacked
the World Trade Center and Pentagon "don't represent an ideology, they don't represent a legitimate political
group of people. They're flat evil. That's all they can think about, is evil." President George W. Bush,
Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech to Employees at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept.
25, 2001) in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 22. For other possible motivations for terrorist attacks, see
infra note 32.
16. NSS, supra note 3, at 5. Legal scholar Antonio Cassese provides a more nuanced definition of interna-
tional terrorism:
International terrorism as a discrete international crime perpetrated in time ofpeace exhibits the
following requisites: (i) is an action normally criminalized in national legal systems: (ii) is transna-
tional in character, i.e. not limited in its action or implications to one country alone; (iii) is carried
out for the purpose of coercing a state, or international organization to do or refrain from doing
something; (iv) uses for this purpose two possible modalities; either spreading terror among civilians
or attacking public or eminent private institutions or their representatives; and (v) is not motivated
by personal gain but by ideological or political aspirations.
Antonio Cassese, The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law, 4 J. INT'L CIM. JUST.
933,957 (2006) (emphasis in original)..
17. NSS, supra note 3, at 5. For an analysis praising the material support laws, see generally Brian P.
Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723 (2005). On
problems generated by the attempt to criminalize the financing of terrorism, see generally Peter Margulies,
Laws of Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions to Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 65 (2007); Erich Ferrari, Deep Freeze: Islamic Charities and the Financial War on Terror, 7 SCHOLAR
205 (2005).
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and to turn the power of modern technologies against us."1 8 Terrorists, in turn, are
supported by rogue states. Because such states and "their terrorist clients" must be
stopped "before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against
the United States and our allies and friends,"' 9 they are viewed as legitimate targets of
preemptive strikes.2 °
This characterization of the enemy as consisting of individuals, non-state organiza-
tions, or "rogue" states motivated by evil rather than by concrete political or eco-
nomic interests, undergirds another presumption- that the laws of war, developed
over several centuries by "civilized" states, cannot be adhered to in the current war on
terror. Consequently, those who wish ill upon the United States are characterized as
irrational, or "madmen." 21 The United States' deviation from standard international
norms is deemed necessary because, presumably, an irrational enemy will not play by
the rules either.22 The assertion that terrorist enemies will not adhere to norms of
international law also provides the rationale for arbitrarily detaining hundreds, per-
haps thousands, of persons as "enemy combatants" without providing them with the
due process guaranteed under international law.23
If the enemy is "evil" as embodied in terrorism, what is the "good" which is being
protected? We are repeatedly told that the war on terror is being fought to preserve
civilization. To quote the Bush administration again, "America will help nations that
need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations
that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists--because the
allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. ' 24 "Civilization" is not precisely de-
fined, but it is clear that what we commonly call Western civilization is being
referenced and that it is intimately associated with certain values. Thus, as President
Bush said in a speech to the German Bundestag, "America and the nations in Europe
18. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction.
19. Id. at 14.
20. On the definition of "rogue states," see id at 13-14. See also Anthony Clark Arend, International Law
and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter Framework, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002) (noting that
"[w]hile almost all states may at times violate international legal rules, a rogue state would be a perennial
violator").
21. See Jeanne M. Woods & James M. Donovan, 'Anticipatory Self-Defense" and Other Stories, 14 KAN.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 487, 494-95 (2005). The "madman theory," i.e., that madmen were dangerously unpredict-
able, had earlier been invoked by President Richard Nixon in suggesting that the North Vietnamese should
be pressured into peace negotiations by being led to believe that he might "do anything," even use nuclear
weapons, to end the war in Vietnam. See STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 582 (1983).
22. "Deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation against nations-means nothing against shadowy
terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to
terrorist allies." George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech at the Graduation
Exercises of the United States Military Academy (June 1, 2002), in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 160.
See also RICHARD A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER: AMERICA'S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS 189-99,
245-47 (2004).
23. See David Cole, The Priority ofMorality: The Emergency Constitution ' Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753,
1754 (2004); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction.
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are more than military allies, we're more than trading partners; we are heirs to the
",25same civilization....
In this framing, civilization is claimed to embody principles that are "right and
true for all people everywhere," and summarized as "the nonnegotiable demands of
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech;
freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance;
and respect for private property. 26 Freedom is the touchstone to which justifications
for the war predictably return. As President Bush said to Congress in September
2001, "They hate our freedoms- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech,
our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."27 In turn, demo-
cratic governance is the guarantor of freedom: "Americans are asking: Why do they
hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber-a democratically elected
government. 28 As Antony Anghie observes, "Democracy plays a crucial dual role in
this [war on terror]: it liberates the oppressed people of Islamic states and it creates
law-abiding societies that would be allies rather than threats to the United States.",
29
A final core presumption is that the United States has the prerogative to take
unilateral action in this war not simply because it was a target of terrorism, but
because it represents the highest form of the civilization whose survival is at issue.
The National Security Strategy states, "The great struggles of the twentieth century
... ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable
model for national success."3° Clearly, the United States is that model. In this
framing, the United States was targeted not because of its foreign policy, or its
heavy-handed wielding of military and economic power, or any other of a range of
possible reasons. Rather, the United States was attacked because it embodies the
values of Western civilization. 3 Thus, immediately after the attacks of September
25. George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech to the German Bundestag (May
23, 2002) in WE WILL PREVAIL supra note 2, at 156. As Richard Drinnon has noted in other contexts, the
term "civilization" is not used "interchangeably with culture, so that other peoples might have 'civilizations.'
Instead, [it is used] to distinguish Western superculture, or the one true 'civilization,' from so-called primitive
cultures." RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND EMPIRE-
BUILDING xxviii (1980).
26. NSS, supra note 3, at 3. As George W. Bush added in his presentation to the Bundestag, "These
convictions bind our civilizations together and set our enemies against us. These convictions are universally
true and right." George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks from Speech to the German Bundestag (May 23, 2002)
in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 157.
27. George W. Bush, Presidential Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 23, 2001) in WE WILL
PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 14.
28. Id.
29. ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 277. The U.S. framing has, of course, been contested. In the hearings
conducted by the International Court of Justice's Eminent Jurist Panel, "ICJ Jurist Hina Jilani asserted that
democracy, or its absence is not the problem. Instead, disenchantment with the conduct of so-called demo-
cratic governments poses the greatest threat to the viability of democratic institutions." Mark W. Vorkink and
Erin M. Scheick, The 'War on Terror'and the Erosion of the Rule ofLaw: The U.S. Hearings of the ICJ Eminent
Jurist Panel, 14 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 2,6 (2006).
30. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction. Similar statements can be found in Excerpted Remarks by the
President from Speech at the Graduation Exercises of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New
York (June 1, 2002) in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 158, 162.
31. For alternate explanations of terrorist attacks on the United States, see generally CHALMERS JOHNSON,
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11, 2001, without having to research the matter or consult in any depth with his
intelligence advisors, President Bush could declare with confidence that "America
was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportu-
nity in the world."
32
It is these premises which, I believe, underlie the United States' assertion that
waging war on terrorism requires it to deviate from longstanding principles of interna-
tional law and that such actions are justified by the greater good of bringing freedom,
democracy and civilization to the planet. Some of the manifestations of this dis-
tinctly American internationalism are addressed in the following section.
II. IMPLEMENTING A "DISTINCTLY AMERICAN INTERNATIONALISM"
The United States possesses unprecedented-and unequaled-strength and influence in
the world.... The great struggle [ofideas] is over. The militant visions ofclass, nation,
and race which promised utopia and delivered misery have been defeated and dis-
credited.... This is [] a time of opportunity for America .... The U.S. national
security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the
union ofour values and our national interests.
The National Security Strategy ofthe United States (2002)33
As noted in the previous section, according to United States officials, the so-called
war on terror is being fought not only to protect the military and economic security
of the American public, but to further freedom and democracy throughout the
world. The National Security Strategy says the aim of American foreign policy "is to
help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are
clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and re-
spect for human dignity... this path is not America's alone. It is open to all." 34 The
cooperation of the international community is seen as vital to the success of this
mission, and the U.S. emphasizes that these values have been generally accepted in
international law. Thus, one of the defining characteristics of rogue states, according
to the National Security Strategy, is that they "[d]isplay no regard for international
law.. .and callously violate international treaties to which they are party."
3 5
Simultaneously, however, the United States is asserting a prerogative to define and
control the path to progress. As noted above, there is but "a single sustainable model
BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2d ed. 2004); WARD CHURCHILL, ON
THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF U. S. IMPERIAL ARRO-
GANCE AND CRIMINALITY (2003) [hereinafter CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS];
ZIAUDDIN SARDAR & MERRYL WYN DAVIES, WHY Do PEOPLE HATE AMERICA? (2d ed. 2003); EQBAL
AHMAD, TERRORISM: THEIRS AND OURS (2001) (interview with David Barsamian); WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE
STATE: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S ONLY SUPERPOWER (2000); NOAM CHOMSKY, THE CULTURE OF TERROR-
ISM (1988).
. 32. George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note
2, at 2.
33. NSS, supra note 3, at 1.
34. Id.
35. NSS, supra note 3, at 14.
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for national success."36 Freedom, democracy, and human dignity are consistently
portrayed as uniquely American values. Human progress, in turn, is framed as re-
quiring a universal implementation of the unique and universally applicable model
that the U.S. exemplifies." Thus, the administration's position paper clarifies that
the United States does not intend to promote international law or legal institutions
per se but "a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values
and our national interests."3 8 In this context "internationalism" appears to refer not
so much to accepted global standards or structures as to those U.S. policies and
practices with transnational consequences.
39
In implementing this so-called American internationalism, U.S. officials have
both emphasized the importance of the global rule of law and simultaneously dis-
tanced themselves from established principles of international law and the institu-
tions created to implement those norms. 40 Thus, for example, when the United
States invaded Iraq in March 2003, it relied upon the prerogative to engage in
"preemptive self-defense" at such times and in such manner as it deems appropriate,
in apparent disregard for the United Nations Charter's prohibition on the use of
force in such circumstances. 4 ' Six months earlier, the White House had stated in the
National Security Strategy that "While the United States will constantly strive to
enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists .... 42 In other words, "we recognize that our best defense is a good
offense," 43 and the goal is to "act against [] emerging threats before they are fully
36. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction.
37. See generally speeches collected in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2. For a critique of the universality of
many of these norms, see generally GUSTAVO ESTEVA & MADHU SURI PRAKASH, GRASSROOTS POST-
MODERNISM: REMAKING THE SOIL OF CULTURES (1998).
38. NSS, supra note 3, at 1.
39. For a summary of the approach to international law taken in the first several years of the George W.
Bush Administration, see Philippe Sands, Lawless World: The Cultures oflnternationalLaw, 41 TEx. INT'L L.J.
387, 391-94 (2006).
40. Analyses of American exceptionalism tend to focus on instances in which U.S. practice diverges from
accepted international law. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights,
International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 777-91 (200 1). Nonethe-
less, it is important to note the other side of the "double standard" invoked-- i.e., the United States' emphasis
on the importance of the global rule of law and its insistence that other governments comport with interna-
tional law- belies the arguments sometimes proffered that international law is simply irrelevant because it is
not uniformly enforced. On double standards, see Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1485-87 (2003); for a summary of "realist" and "institutionalist" critiques of interna-
tional law, see David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 469, 472-80 (2001).
41. While military actions undertaken in self-defense are permitted by Article 51 of the Charter, this does
not extend to the preemptive use of force under the circumstances faced by the United States in Iraq. See
generally MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE (2002) http://www.asil.org/
taskforce/oconnell.pdf. The UN Charter is a treaty under which member states explicitly agree that if conflict-
ing obligations arise between the Charter and other treaties, member states' "obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." UN Charter, Art. 103; see also Jos6 E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873, 878 (2003).
42. NSS, supra note 3, at 6.
43. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction.
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formed," for "we cannot let our enemies strike first."44 This, of course, was the
rationale for launching the current war in Iraq.45 Another striking example of the
recent exercise of American exceptionalism is found in the Bush administration',s
position that the war on terror justifies the U.S. government's disregard for, or
unilateral reinterpretation of, the Geneva Conventions and their requirements con-
cerning the treatment of captured combatants and noncombatants. Despite ob-
jections from the State Department and U.S. military officials, President Bush
announced in January 2002 that members of al Qaida and the Taliban captured by
U.S. forces would not be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conven-
tions.4 6 Shortly thereafter, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, later appointed
Attorney General, sent a memorandum to Bush supporting this position by arguing
that the "new paradigm" occasioned by the war on terrorism "renders obsolete
Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint
some of its provisions."
4 7
The position that suspected terrorists were exempt from the Geneva Conventions
laid the groundwork for the subsequent torture of prisoners held at Guantd.namo
Bay, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in secret prisons in undisclosed locations around
the world 4 8-the most notorious example being the abuse perpetrated by U.S. mili-
tary personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.49 In perhaps its most flagrant
44. NSS, supra note 3, Introduction. As AntonyAnghie notes, the terrorist is being constructed not only in
terms of the discourse of race, or economics, but now of war: "It is principally through the language of
war-as-self-defence that the 'other' is constructed, excluded from the realm of law, attacked, liberated, de-
feated and transformed." ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 278.
45. According to Harold Koh, "Diplomatic historians will long revisit the missed steps that led to the
messy start of the second Gulf War. My view is that a transnational legal process solution-the exercise of
multilateral coercive power, led by the United States through the U.N. mechanism-was available, but
tragically bungled." Koh, supra note 41, at 1479, 1518 (2003). See also ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 275-76.
46. See Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva
Convention to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 541, 549-50 (2004) (citing a Bush administration statement of January 18, 2002, and noting that
the analytical justifications for this position were presented in a memorandum of January 9, 2002, sent by
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert Delahunty to the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense).
47. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to George W. Bush, President of the United
States (Jan. 25, 2002) available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/gnzls12502mem2gwb2.
html. See also Wallach, supra note 47, at 552. For a compilation of the full text of related memoranda and
reports, see generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005).
48. For a summary of the United States' 2006 report to the supervisory body of the Convention Against
Torture and that committee's findings that the indefinite detentions of persons at Guantinamo and those
extrajudicially "rendered" to third countries constitutes a violation of the Convention, see United States'
Periodic Report to Committee Against Torture, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 703 (2006). On the findings of the
Organization of American States' Inter-American Commission, see generally Brian D. Tittemore, Guan-
tanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; A Case for
International Oversight in the StruggleAgainst Terrorism, 6 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 378 (2006).
49. According to Wallach, "these legal rationales, and the Geneva-prohibited interrogation techniques
they approved, eventually resulted in the abuses of Abu Ghraib." Wallach, supra note 47, at 546. See also id. at
599-603. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee
Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
345 (2007). On Abu Ghraib, see generally SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11
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assertion of a unique prerogative to disregard the norms of international law appli-
cable to the rest of the world, the United States has undermined the prohibitions
against torture articulated in the Convention Against Torture, ratified by the United
States5 ° and accepted as ajus cogens or preemptory norm of customary international
law.5
1
In each of the previously mentioned cases, the United States has asserted the right,
ability, and even responsibility to act unilaterally and in apparent violation of interna-
tional law when multinational institutions do not function in ways U.S. officials
believe most effective. Most often, these policies and practices have been justified by
the recent emergence of terrorist threats against the United States.52 The attacks on
the Pentagon and World Trade Center are often cited as the inauguration of a new
era of global insecurity in which different rules of engagement apply. However, as
early as 1999, George W. Bush announced in a campaign speech that "America has
determined enemies, who hate our values and resent our success" and declared that
he would bring to the table a "distinctly American internationalism." 53 Thus, al-
TO ABu GHRAIB (2004). On abuses at the U.S. prison in Guant'namo Bay, Cuba, see generally MICHAEL
RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD KNOW (2004).
50. In August 2002, the Department ofJustice Office ofLegal Counsel prepared a memorandum limiting
its definition of torture to actions causing "physical pain ... equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying
serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death" or psychological
harm "lasting for months or even years." Further, the torturer has to specifically intend to inflict severe pain,
thereby exempting those whose purpose is to obtain information. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst.
Att'y. Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y. Gen. (Aug. 1, 2002) available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee8l02mem.pdf. By contrast, Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See Robert K. Goldman,
Trivializing Torture: The Office of Legal Counsel's 2002 Opinion Letter and International law Against Torture,
12 No. 1 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 1, 1, 3 (2004). In December 2004, the Justice Department's position was
superseded by a memorandum acknowledging that torture violates international law and omitting the narrow
definition cited above. However, it was not clear that the administration considered this binding on CIA
interrogations. See Mark A. Drumbl, Guant4namo, Rasul and the Twilight of Law, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 897,
914-15 (2005).
5 1. On customary law, see generally Stephanie L. Williams, "Your Honor, IAm Here Today Requesting the
Court's Permission to Torture Mr. Doe" The Legality of Torture as a Means to an End v. The Illegality of Torture
as a Violation ofJus Cogens Norms Under Customary International Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REv.
301 (2004). Regarding the effect these actions have had on the United States' human rights reputation, see
generally Harold Hongju Koh, Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635
(2007).
52. Thus, for examples, the NationalSecurity Strategy notes that because today's adversaries use unconven-
tional means and attack without warning, "anticipatory action" may be necessary "even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." NSS, supra note 3, at 15.
53. George W. Bush, Governor, Tex., A Distinctly American Internationalism, Speech at Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library (Nov. 19, 1999) available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm;
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though there is widespread agreement that a new paradigm is emerging, it would
appear to be a shift that was in the making well before the inception of the current
war on terror.
In fact, the simultaneous invocation of and self-exemption from the rule of faw by
U.S. leaders is neither a new phenomenon nor unique to the Bush administration.
When we look beyond the specific arguments about contemporary enemies to the
broader rationale being proffered for the United States' failure to comply with select
norms of international law, we see old and familiar exceptionalist justifications being
made. These rationalizations are deeply rooted in the United States' longstanding
claims to singular representation of the apex of Western civilization, and rely heavily
on the colonial presumptions of international law as it emerged to justify European
imperial expansion. Thus, it is my belief that current U.S. claims of a unilateral
prerogative to re-shape international law are most effectively addressed by first exam-
ining and deconstructing the historical roots of American exceptionalism. The fol-
lowing sections provide examples from American history over the past four centuries
that illustrate this thesis.
1J1. 17T CENTURY ROOTS: THE AMERICAN VISION
We have been taught, inside the classroom and outside of it, that there exists an entity
called the West, and that one can think of this West as a society and civilization
independent of and in opposition to other societies and civilizations. Many of us even
grew up believing that this West has a genealogy, according to which ancient Greece
begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance,
the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the
industrial revolution. Industry, crossed with democracy, in turn yielded the United
States, embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit ofhappiness.
Eric Wolf Europe and the People Without History54
In waging the war on terror, the United States is often portrayed by its historians
and leaders as the foremost representatiye of the universal values embodied in West-
ern civilization. This was, perhaps, best summarized by President Bush's statement
that "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism
ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom-and a single sustainable
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. ... " In other
words, the American model of social, political and economic organization represents
the highest stage of human development. It is the only truly viable option for any
society: "These values of freedom are' right and true for every person, in every
society-and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common
see also Bush Outlines Foreign Poliy, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 1999, available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilworld/
americas/529018.stm. The phrase was apparently originated by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.
See J. Michael Waller, Bush Doctrine on Free-World Safety: the new National Security Strategy abandons the
relativism of old in favor of what Condoleezza Rice has called 'distinctly American internationalism, 'BNET, Oct.
15, 2002, http://findarticles.com/p/artices/mi-m 1571/is_38_ 18/ai_93457398/pg_ l.
54. Etuc R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 5 (1982).
55. NSS, supra note 3, at Introduction.
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calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages." 56 This perspec-
tive presumes that there is a unilinear trajectory of human progress, and that history
is the story of human development along that one path.
As Richard Drinnon has noted in other contexts, the term "civilization" is not
used "interchangeably with culture, so that other peoples might have 'civilizations.'
Instead, [it is used] to distinguish Western superculture, or the one true 'civilization,'
from so-called primitive cultures."57 If these premises accurately reflect the perspec-
tives of U.S. leaders in their current reshaping of the contours of international law,
the war on terror can, perhaps, best be understood as the latest phase in the extension
of European and Euroamerican colonialism.58 Consideration of some of the parallels
between the rationale utilized in the war on terror and those given for the European
colonial project, the establishment of the United States, and more recent American
imperial ventures illustrate this historical continuity.
A. Puritan Ideology: The Beacon on the Hill
The underlying ideology of American exceptionalism-the assertion that the
United States represents the highest stage of civilization achieved by humanity to
date and, in particular, that it uniquely embodies the values of freedom and democ-
racy-can be traced back to the earliest English settlers' understanding of what their
colonial venture would represent. Especially for the Puritans, North America was a
promised land and, according to Anders Stephanson, their small settlements were
simply the precursor to the establishment of the New Israel (or New Canaan) through
which the world was to be regenerated and "God and humankind... reconciled at
last."59 This vision, with or without the religious framing, continues to shape Ameri-
can identity. Thus, in 1630, Puritan minister John Winthrop predicted that "wee
[sic] shall be as a Citty [sic] upon a Hill," and more than three centuries later,
President Ronald Reagan echoed this notion when he said in his farewell address,
"And how stands the city on this winter night? ... [S]he's still a beacon, still a magnet
for all who must have freedom .... 6  George W, Bush also referenced this imagery
when he said on September 11, 2001, "America was targeted for attack because we're
56. Id.
57. DRINNON, supra note 26, at xxviii. See also Diego Panizza, Conceptions of International Order in
Eighteenth Century Political Thought: A Typologv in Context, 17 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 61, 65 (1997) (noting
how the theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment transformed the descriptions of societies in Montesquieu's
Spirit of the Law into the "stages" of savagery, barbarism, and civilization, stressing "the idea that the process
was one of'improvement"').
58. For an extensive analysis of the evolution of international law from this perspective, see generally
ANGHIE, supra note 13.
59. ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DEsTINY: AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE EMPIRE OF RIGHT 7
(1995). See'also William T. Cavanaugh, Messianic Nation: A Christian Theological Critique of American
Exceptionalism, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 261,262-64 (2005).
60. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill"- American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's
Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1335, 1336 (2006) (quoting John Winthrop, A Modell of
Christian Charity (1630) in SETTLEMENTS TO SOCIETY: 1584-1763 66, 68 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1966) and
President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989)).
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the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world."6 1 From Winthrop
to Reagan, to the imagery associated with the Statue of Liberty6 2 and its invoca-
tion in the war on terror, the metaphor of the U.S. as a beacon of light is inex-
tricably linked to the early English colonists' faith in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon
civilization.
While other European powers played a significant role in settling the North
American continent,6 3 the United States has always seen itself as a uniquely English
creation, and the vision of the American mission to bring freedom and civilization to
this continent and beyond is most clearly articulated in the first instance by colonial
settlers in what we now call New England.6 4 By and large, both the Pilgrims and
larger numbers of Puritans who followed them were convinced that the Anglo-Saxon
racerepresented the highest stage of European civilization.6 5 As evidence, they empha-
sized that the Saxons had developed structures of political governance more demo-
cratic than those imposed by the Normans in their Conquest of 1066 and that, with
the Protestant Reformation, they had overcome the domination of the Roman
Catholic Church.6 6
The Puritans saw their journey to the New World as a "reenactment of the Exodus
narrative revolv[ing] around a powerful theology of chosenness." 67 Central to their
worldview was the concept of predestination-the belief in a divinely ordained plan
for the world, and the notion that God had a particular covenant with humanity.
68
61. WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 2. See also Peter Fitzpatrick, "What are the Gods to Us Now?"
Secular Theology and the Moderniy of Law, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 161, 171 (2007).
62. See LYNNE CHENEY, AMERICA: A PATRIOTIC PRIMER (2002). This children's book depicts the Statue of
Liberty on the unnumbered page for the letter "A." In the notes, Cheney quotes a portion of Emma Lazarus'
1883 poem inscribed on the statue: "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me: I lift my
lamp beside the golden door!" In the full poem, a prior phrase says: "A mighty woman with a torch, whose
flame/Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name/ Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand/Glows world-
wide welcome..." EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883) available athttp://www.libertystatepark.com/
emma.htm. See also Joseph M. de Torre, The Roots of International Law and the Teachings of Francisco de
Vitoria as a Foundation for Transcendent Human Rights and Global Peace, 2 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 131, n.40
(2004).
63. See ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN SPAIN, BRITAIN AND
FRANCE, C. 1500- C.1800 63-76 (1995); see also Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A
Historical Rejoinder to the Claim of 'Universal Recognition 'of the Doctrine ofDiscovery, 36 SETON HALL L. REV.
481, 499-540 (2006) (discussing distinctions between the views of the Spanish, French, Dutch, and English
powers).
64. See CHARLES M. SEGAL & DAVID C. STINEBACK, PURITANS, INDIANS, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 30
(1977) (noting the similarities between the Puritan experience and the westward movement of manifest
destiny). These similarities may also be, to some extent, a result of the influence of New England influence on
American historiography. See also STEPHANSON, supra note 60, at 4.
65. SEGAL & STINEBACK, supra note 65, at 31 (noting the arrival of 100 Pilgrims in 1620, and 1500
Puritans in 1630).
66. See REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-
SAXONISM 9-14 (1981). See also RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOL-
OGY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1600-1860 37-42 (1973) (discussing development of Puritan ideas as
derived from the Protestant middle class of English cities).
67. STEPHANSON, supra note 60, at 6.
68. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DiS-
COURSES OF CONQUEST 164-65 (1990).
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The colonists could fulfill their part of this contract by bringing salvation to the New
World, and in return, they would be rewarded by God in this life and the next. The
"savages" of the Americas would benefit by receiving both Christianity and civiliza-
tion, including "a well governed commonwealth" and education in the "mechanical
occupations, arts, and liberal sciences."
69
These early English settlers, however, were concerned less with the salvation of the
"savages" than with carving out space in North America for their promised land.7 °
Most fundamentally, they believed themselves to be creating a new model of civiliza-
tion for the European world; the purported benefits being brought to indigenous
peoples in that process were of lesser concern. 7 1 Nonetheless, they were not operating
in a vacuum. In order to establish that they were furthering the civilization repre-
sented by Europe, they needed to rationalize their ventures within the law of nations
dominant in that world, much as the United States today relies upon the fundamen-
tal principles of civilization and international law to justify its actions. 72
B. The Legal Context ofEuroamerican Colonialism
The "law of nations," what we now call international law, was designed not only to
regulate relations between "civilized" states, but to rationalize their colonial ventures.
It has, therefore, consistently incorporated and relied upon the presumption of the
superiority of European civilization.73 To quote Robert A. Williams, Jr., this pre-
sumed superiority has been "the redemptive source of the West's presumed mandate
to impose its vision of truth on non-Western peoples." 74 Conquest has always been
significant to the narrative of colonialism, but claims of bringing the world to a
higher stage of civilization could not be based solely on raw power.7 5 This would
pose significant ideological problems given the purported contrast between the order
said to characterize western societies and the state of constant warfare Europeans
claimed prevailed amongst those deemed savage.7 6 As a result, law has assumed a
69. Id. at 172 (quoting George Peckham, an early English promoter of American colonization).
70. See SLOTKIN, supra note 67 at 38-39.
71. See NEAL SALISBURY, MANITOU AND PROVIDENCE: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE MAKING OF NEW
ENGLAND, 1500-1643 178 (1982). See generally Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justif-
ing (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R -C.L. L. REV. 413, 430-431 (2006) (discussing the transition
in settler ideology from viewing indigenous people as objects of salvation to threats to be destroyed).
72. Sacvan Bercovitch notes that the "New England Puritans gave America the status of visible sainthood,"
linking this concept "the American Way, to the usurpation of American identity by the United States, and to
the anthropomorphic nationalism that characterizes our literature .... American dream, manifest destiny,
redeemer nation, and, fundamentally, the American self as representative of universal rebirth." Art Wolfe,
Corporations as Ships:An Inquiry into PersonalAccountability and Institutional Legitimacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 49,
82 (1991) (quoting SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE PURITAN ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 108 (1975)).
73. See generally, ANGHIE, supra note 13; WILLIAMS, supra note 69.
74. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 6.
75. This appears to parallel the manner in which the United States currently emphasizes the importance of
the global rule of law while exempting itself from many of its mandates. See supra notes 41-52 and accompany-
ing text.
76. See Christopher Tomlins, In a Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse ofEnglish Colonizing, and the
Refisals "of American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 451, 468 (2003) ("[F]or colonizers, that which lay
beyond familiar civil association was a space of deprivation and savagery, inhabited only by barbarism's
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primary role in the ideology of Western civilization, and European colonial expan-
sion was conceived, from the beginning, as a legal project.77
Christian Europe's conception of a unitary and hierarchical system of law grew out
of an understanding of the world as a place in which God ruled over man and man,
in turn, was responsible for governing nature. 7 8 Once civilization had been defined
in terms of distance from nature, the gradation of humanity into those more and less
civilized (i.e., those who were further removed from or closer to. a state of nature)
justified the rule of the civilized over the barbarian or the savage. As a result, the
law became an instrument of the subordination or "uplifting" of the Other, depend-
ing upon one's perspective. 79 Furthermore, in very practical terms, international law
became a means of governing relations among the "civilized" states aspiring to em-
pire, enabling them to devote more of their resources to acquiring territories and
developing trade, and less to fighting each other.8°
In the mid-thirteenth century, Pope Innocent IV attempted to reconcile Aristote-
lian natural law with the notion of papal supremacy by declaring that non-Christian
peoples were rational beings and thus subjects of natural law, but that those who
rejected God's will were irrational and, therefore, in violation of that law."' The
profound lack of order[.]"); see generally Devin 0. Pendas, "The Magical Scent ofthe Savage" Colonial Violence,
the Crisis of Civilization, and the Origins of the Legalist Paradigm of War, 30 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 29
(2007).
77. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 6-8 (discussing the legitimating function of law and legal discourse in
the colonial enterprise); see also Tomlins, supra note 77, at 474 (noting that law in the form of English colonial
charters not only provided the medium for actualizing colonial relationships between people and places in the
Americas, but also "were themselves the very violence they occluded").
78. This is stated forthrightly in the creation story foundational to the Judeo-Christian tradition: "So God
created man in his own image... male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said
unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." Genesis
1:27-28 (KingJames); See also Robert A. Williams,Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins ofthe Status ofthe
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 11-25 (1983) (discussing hierocratic
structure of papal law); VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 78-95 (1994)
(discussing distinctions between western and indigenous views on the relationship between people and
nature). On the ongoing legal impact of the western conception of nature as subject to human domination,
see generally Alex Geisinger, Sustainable Development and the Domination of Nature: Spreading the Seed of the
Western Ideology ofNature, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 43 (1999).
79. For explication of these interactive and often situationally-employed tropes, see generally ANTHONY
PAGDEN, EUROPEAN ENCOUNTERS WITH THE NEW WORLD: FROM RENAISSANCE TO ROMANTICISM (1993).
80. At least as early as 1493, a primary motive propelling the evolution of colonial law'was "keeping the
peace between the great European powers engaged in the competition for overseas territories." SHARON
KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE45 (1996).
81. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 44-47. Another scholar, Matthew Ritter, notes, "Throughout its
various historical, philosophical, theological and ethical formulations... natural law has retained a governing
structural presumption: A human" nature that is the same for us all, in which inheres the essential means
properly to realize itself in accordance with its nature." Matthew A. Ritter, "Human Rights" Would You
Recognize One ifyou Saw One?A Philosophical Hearing oflnternational Rights Talk, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 265,
279 (1997). Moreover, this nature, and therefore its law, can be discovered by human reason. Id. See also
JOHN C. MOHAWK, UTOPIAN LEGACIES: A HISTORY OF CONQUEST AND OPPRESSION IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 67 (2000) (suggesting that, ironically, Innocent was in all likelihood working from translations of
Aristotle obtained from Islamic sources).
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Church remained responsible for interpreting and ensuring the enforcement of natu-
ral law. Within this universalizing vision of law intent on eliminating or assimilating
all other perspectives, those considered infidels possessed and had dominion over
their own lands, but if they insisted on acting irrationally by denying Christian
supremacy, their property could be confiscated. s2 Thus, "[c]enturies prior to Colum-
bus's transatlantic voyage, the thirteenth-century canon lawyer-pope Innocent IV
had discovered for Christendom a new world of legal discourse, premised on the
central orienting myth that the Christian European's vision of reason and truth
entailed norms obligatory for all peoples."'8 3
Much of the subsequent framing of colonial law by discovery era legal scholars
relied upon secularized variations of Innocent IV's articulation. s4 Writing in the first
half of the sixteenth century, legal scholar Franciscus de Vitoria applied the prin-
ciples of Thomistic natural law to Spanish discoveries and settlement, laying the
foundation for an international jurisprudence designed to address relationships not
only between recognized independent sovereign states, but also between the coloniz-
ers and the colonized. 5 In Vitoria's analysis, infidels were rational beings and, there-
fore, subject to the law of nations. As such, they had the right to possess and exercise
jurisdiction over their lands.8 6 However, Vitoria also attributed substantive natural
law rights to the colonizing powers that effectively undermined indigenous peoples'
rights to their lands. For example, the Spanish had a right to travel to and sojourn
in foreign lands, and to proselytize those they encountered there. They also had a
right to engage in commerce and trade with them. 7 It was from these premises that
European settlers derived their purported right to colonize indigenous peoples and
their lands.
Much of the subsequent legal justification for colonialism rests upon what is often
termed the "doctrine of discovery."8 While the concept can be traced to Vitoria's
82. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 43-49.
83. Id. at49-5D.
84. Williams describes this universalization of law as a "singular innovation" that "initiated the process by
which the European state system's legal discourse was ultimately liberated from its stultifying, expressly
theocentric, medievalized moorings and was adapted to the rationalizing demands of Renaissance Europe's
secularizedwill to empire." Id. at96-97. SeealsoANGHIE, supra note 13, at 15.
85. Vitoria's legal framework was explicated in a series of lectures dealing with relations between the
Spanish and the Indians of the New World, most famously De Indis NoviterInventis, ("On the Indians Lately
Discovered") and De jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros ("On the Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the
Barbarians"). See KORMAN, supra note 81, at 52-56; ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 13-28; WILLIAMS, supra note
69, at 96-108. On the principles of natural law articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, see WILLIAMS, supra note
69, at 41-50.
86. "Unbelief does not destroy either natural law or human law; but ownership and dominion are based
either on natural law or human law; therefore they are not destroyed by want of faith." ANGHIt, supranote 13,
at 18 (quoting Franciscus de Vitoria, The First Relectio of the Reverend Father, Brother Franciscius de
Vitoria, On the Indians Lately Discovered, in FRANCISI DE VIcTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IvRE BELLI RELEc-
TIONES 123 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Institution of Washington 1917)); see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 97; L.C. Green, Claims to Territory in ColonialAmerica, in LAW OF NATIONS AND
THE NEW WORLD 39-40 (L.C. Green & Olive P. Dickason eds., 1989).
87. ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 23; see also KORMAN, supra note 81, at 53.
88. See generally Robert J. Miller,' The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(2005); Watson, supra note 64, at 499-540.
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analysis, Vitoria was clear that rights deriving from discovery only applied to vacant
lands, or territorium res nullius. With respect to inhabited territory, the doctrine
simply reflected an agreement between European colonizing powers over their respec-
tive priority to exercise these rights to sojourn, proselytize, or engage in trade. 89 This
emphasis on the ordering of relations among the European colonial powers was
summarized quite well by Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in the early
19th century. Since the various states engaged in "discovery" were "all in pursuit of
nearly the same object," Marshall observed:
[I]t was necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law
by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated, as
between themselves. The principle was, that discovery gave title to the government
by whose subjects, or under whose authority, it was made, against other govern-
ments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other
Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation makingthe discovery the sole right of
acquiring the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a
right with which no European power could interfere.
90
From the perspective of those who intended to settle on native lands, the problem
with Vitoria's framework was that it only gave the discovering power the right to
acquire lands by otherwise legal means. "Conquest" is often proffered, along with
discovery, as justification for colonization. However, occupying and appropriating
inhabited land was not considered legal unless it came as the result of a "just war.
"91
Vitoria posited that colonial powers had rights under natural law to travel and
sojourn among the Indians, to participate in commerce with them, and to send
missionaries amongst them. Indian resistance to any of these activities was irrational,
violated natural law, and thus provided grounds for waging "just war." 92 While
contemporary historians contest that the preconditions for "just war" were ever met,
any resistance to colonial incursions was interpreted by the colonizers as a violation
of law and used to legitimize warfare.
9 3
Indigenous peoples were characterized as having reason and, therefore, were sub-
ject to natural law, but "reason" was normatively interpreted by referencing Euro-
89. See Ward Churchill, The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous Self-
Determination and the Question of World Order, 81 OR. L.-Ri v. 663, 665-67 (2002) [hereinafter Churchill,
Law Stood Squarely].
90. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823). See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian
Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 253-56 (1986) [hereinafter Williams, Algebra].
91. See Churchill, Law Stood Squarely, supra note 90, at 665-72.
92. See ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 20-24; see also Williams, Algebra, supra note 91 at 247 (observing that
"[l]ike most writers of this period, Alberico Gentili identified the Law of Nations with natural law, asserting
that the rules of this Law were binding on all mankind owing to their grounding in universal and absolute
reason.").
93. See Churchill, Law Stood Squarely, supra note 9 1, at 680-86 (discussing the failure of native peoples to
violate these conditions); see also ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 20-28 (discussing the characterization of resistance
asperse violations).
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pean understandings of civilization. As Antony Anghie summarizes, Vitoria de-
scribed war as "the means by which Indians and their territory are converted into
Spaniards and Spanish territory, the agency by which the Indians thus achieve their
full human potential."9 4 Similarly, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, an-
other natural law scholar Alberico Gentili argued that "if men clearly sin against the
laws of nature and mankind, I believe that any one whatsoever may check such men
by force of arms."95 Those deemed uncivilized were, by definition, in violation of
such laws. Thus, Hugo Grotius, often credited with founding the discipline of
international law,96 characterized those who "excessively violate the law of nature or
of nations" as barbarians, and argued that "the most just war is against savage beasts,
the next against men who are like beasts."
97
It was against this backdrop of legal theory that we approach the early American
colonists' claims of establishing exceptional communities. Initially, at least, English
settlers in North America were reluctant to rely on a theory of conquest by just war,
because of their commitment, framed within the context of the Norman Conquest,
to "the 'continuity theory' of constitutional law in which the legal and political
institutions of the conquered are deemed to survive a conquest." 98 The first and
easiest, if least accurate, way to justify the establishment of English colonies was by
declaring the land to be vacant and claiming title under the doctrine of territorium res
nullius, or the right to claim title to unoccupied lands. 99 This, however, required not
only that the colonizers have a prior discovery claim against other colonial powers,
but also that the land be uninhabited.
94. ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 23.
95. 2 ALBERIcO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRi TRES (1612), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, at 122 (James Brown Scott ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Oxford: The Clarendon Press 1933); see
generally Benedict Kingsbury, Confronting Difference: The Puzzling Durability of Gentilis Combination of
Pragmatic Pluralism and NormativeJudgment, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1998) (discussing Gentili's continuing
influence on contemporary international legal theory).
96. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (3d ed. 1999).
97. Williams, Algebra, supra note 91 at 250 (citing Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libi Tres). See
also James Thuo Gathii, The American Origins of Liberal and Illiberal Regimes of International Economic
Governance in the Marshall Court, 54 BUFF. L. REv. 765, 800 (2006) (explaining that a similar argument
would be made by Justice John Marshall, who uses the theories of "discovery" and "conquest" to justify the
taking of American Indian lands on the grounds that the Indians were "fierce savages, whose occupation was
war .... (quotingJohnson, 21 U.S. at 590)). This, too, constituted an early example of American exceptional-
ism for, as Gathii notes, "although [Marshall] had spoken eloquently against the rights of belligerents insofar
as they undermined free commerce in the United States' international relations with its European counter-
parts, for Indians, war was the solution for their subjugation." Id. at 801.
98. PAGDEN, supra note 64, at 77. Pagden also notes that "no less a person than Francis Bacon had
demonstrated that 'a country gained by conquest hath no right to be governed by English law."' Id.
99. Pagden notes that the "only major exception to this rule was the much discussed conquest of Virginia,"
where English daims were based on "the claim supposedly grounded in English common law that all infidels
were aliens, perpetui enemici, 'perpetual enemies' with whom there could, by definition, be no peace.
PAGDEN, supra note 64, at 94. However, even claims based on res nullius required prior discovery. For this
purpose, the English relied upon mythic accounts of a Welsh Prince Madoc who was said to have arrived in
what is now Alabama in the twelfth century, supplemented by claims based on John Cabot's discovery of
Florida in 1497. See id. at 81; WILLIAMs, supra note 69, at 121-22, 178.
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C. Justifing Conquest by Creihting Vacant Lands
Even before the Pilgrims set sail, John Smith had "proclaimed himself the true
discoverer" of "New England," and these settlers arrived in 1620 with a map on
which Smith had already identified the Plymouth colony.' 0 0 According to Smith, the
land he had discovered was "so planted with Gardens and Come fields, and so well
inhabited with a goodly, strong and well proportioned people" that its suitability for
colonization could not be contested.' 1 Yet, virtually in the same breath, he de-
scribed it as his favorite "of all the foure parts of the world that I have yet seene not
inhabited." 10 2 In other words, he was invoking the doctrine of res nullius to claim
title to the territory by virtue of his discovery, relegating its peoples to non-human
status despite his own glowing descriptions of both the peoples and their agricultural
accomplishments.
The numerous Puritan settlers who soon followed relied on a combination of
similarly contradictory arguments incorporating the notions that the land was unoc-
cupied, that conquest had in any case been justified because of the savage nature of
the Indians, and that the Indians had consented to the takings. John Cotton, perhaps
the best known Puritan preacher, analogized their settlement to God's provision of a
homeland for the people of Israel, noting that God had "espied" and "discovered" the
land for them and had "carried them" to it over "all hindrances."' 0 3 Once there,
Cotton explained, God had made room for them in three ways--by casting out their
enemies, by giving them "favor in the eyes of any native people" who thereafter sold
or gave them the land, and by "mak[ing] a country though not altogether void of
inhabitants, yet void in that place where they reside."'
0 4
John Smith's counterfactual assertion that the land was "uninhabited" would soon
become somewhat more accurate as a result of epidemics of smallpox and other
diseases introduced by the colonizers, as well as by warfare and massacres.! ° 5 In some
areas, diseases introduced by Europeans led to the deaths of up to ninety percent of
the inhabitants within two generations of initial contact. 10 6 This was proffered by
100. See SALISBURY, supra note 72, at 98, 109.
101. Id. at 98 (quoting Travels and Works of CaptainJohn Smith).
102. Id.
103. SEGAL & STEINBACK, supra note 65, at 52.
104. Id. at 52-53. Similar arguments were made by the founder of the Massachusetts Bay colony, John
Winthrop, who added the notion that colonizers had an equal right to share in commonly held property. See
id. at 50-51.
105, FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIALISM, AND THE CANT OF CON-
QUEST 16-31, 207-08 (1976); SALISBURY, supra note 72, at 101-06. When Juan Ponce de Le6n first landed in
Florida in 1513, there were approximately fifteen million people living in the territory now claimed by the
United States and Canada. See Ward Churchill, "Nits Make Lice", The Extermination of North American
Indians, 1607-1996, in A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492
TO THE PRESENT 129, 131-37 (1997) [hereinafter Churchill, "Nits make Licel. A pre-Columbian population
of approximately 15 million in North America is an average commonly accepted by scholars. See, e.g.,
KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND THE COLUMBIAN LEGACY
316 (1990). See also BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1937, at 11 no. 14 (1938) (showing that by 1900, the Census Bureau
recorded less than 250,000 native people living in the United States).
106. See, e.g., DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE
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the colonists as evidence that God was on their side. In 1631, Cotton Mather
rejoiced that "God ended the Con troversy [between the Massachusetts' Bay Colony
and its Indian neighbors] by sending the Smallpox amongst the Indians ... who
were before that time exceedingly numerous,"10 7 and the governor of the Carolina
Colony announced that "the hand of God was eminently seen in thin[n]ing the
Indians, to make room for the English."' 10 8
More than the hand of God was at work, however. As early as 1636, an officer of
the Massachusetts Colony was tried and executed by the Narragansetts for having
deliberately infected them with smallpox three years earlier.10 9 In 1763, during the
last of the "French and Indian Wars," Lord Jeffrey Amherst suggested that an officer
under his command initiate peace talks with the Ottawas, allies of the French, in
order to provide them "gifts" infected with smallpox. Amherst wrote, "You will do
well to [infect] the Indians by means of blankets as well as to try every other method
that can serve to extirpate this execrable race.""1 1
The native peoples were not disappearing as a result of disease alone, of course.
While the English colonists often found it expedient to have peaceful trade relations
with their American Indian neighbors, their constant expansion continued to gener-
ate native resistance. In keeping with the theories of Vitoria, Gentili, and Grotius,
this provided the excuse for warfare, as any resistance was characterized as the "treach-
ery" of savages, and any killing of Europeans described as "massacre."111 To give just
NEW WORLD 118-21 (1992) (noting native population declines in the 90"h percentile in eastern Virginia and
New England during the late 17"' and early 18"' centuries); 1 JAMES KIRBY MARTIN, RANDY ROBERTS,
STEVEN MINTz, LINDA 0. McMURRAY & JAMES H. JONES, AMERICA AND ITS PEOPLE, VOLUME ONE To
1877 17-19 (2d ed., 1993) (noting a 90 percent population decline in Mexico following Cortes' invasion).
107. PERCY M. ASHBURN, THE RANKS OF DEATH: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA
22 (Frank D. Ashburn ed., Porcupine Press 1980) (1947) (quoting Cotton Mather).
108. JOHN ARCHDALE, A NEW DESCRIPTION OF THAT FERTILE AND PLEASANT PROVINCE OF CAROLINA
(1707), reprinted in NARRATIVES OF EARLY CAROLINA, 1650-1708 284-85 (Alexander S. Salley, Jr. ed., 1911).
While few Americans would today claim that the diseases which decimated Indian nations were the result of
divine intervention on behalf of European colonialism, most see it as a "natural" and inadvertent consequence
of intercontinental contact. See, e.g., 1 STEVEN T. KATZ, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT,
VOLUME 1: THE HOLOCAUST AND MASS DEATH BEFORE THE MODERN AGE 20 (1994) (describing the
depopulation of the New World as "largely an unintended tragedy" caused by "[n]ature, not malice" (emphasis
in original)). It must be recognized, however, that while the very first Europeans to come into contact with
indigenous societies might have been unaware that they brought with them deadly pathogens, by "1550 at the
latest, and probably earlier, it was common knowledge in Europe that there was a firm correlation between the
arrival of 'explorers, settlers and military expeditions' on the one hand and massive die-offs of native peoples
from [diseases such as smallpox, typhoid, diphtheria, measles and various plagues] on the other." Churchill,
"Nits Make Lice, "supra note 106, at 137-38.
109. Although it was known that Narragansetts had killed the officer John Oldham, the Massachusetts
and Plymouth Plantation governors publicly blamed the Pequots, who were both militarily weaker than the
Narragansetts and had land more immediately coveted by the colonies, leading to a war in which the Pequots
were virtually annihilated. Id. at 152.
110. Id. at 154 (citing E. WAGNER STEARN AND ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFECTS OF SMALLPOX ON THE
DESTINY OF THE AMERINDIAN 44-45 (1945), which quotes a letter from Lord Jeffery Amherst to Colonel
Henry Bouquet written in 1763). See also STANNARD, supra note 107, at 112-17. For an overview of the
intentional infliction of disease in this context, see Churchill, "Nits Make Lice, "supra note 106, at 151-57.
111. According to Williams, many of the settlers already believed that "the way of conquering [the
Indians] is much more easy than of civilizing them by fair means." WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 218 (quoting 3
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one example, when a confederation of Indian nations attacked English settlements
which by 1622 already extended more than 60 miles from Jamestown, the Virginia
Company announced that "our hands which before were tied with gentleness and
fair usage, are now set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the savages .... So
that we..' may now by right of war, and law of nations, invade the country and
destroy them .... 12
Just as the enemy in the war on terror has been portrayed as evil, irrational, and
uncivilized,1 13 early colonists frequently portrayed American Indians as irrational
and irredeemable savages, agents of the devil, and even cannibals. For example,
William Bradford, Governor of the Plymouth Colony, claimed that his neighbors
were "savage people, who are cruel, barbarous, and most treacherous, being most
furious in their rage and merciless where they overcome; not being content only to
take away life, but delight to torment men in the most bloody manner that may be;
flaying some alive.., cutting off the member and joints of others... [and eating]
the collops of their flesh in their sight whilst they live . 14 lAthough the Puritan
leaders were well aware of the falsity of such portrayals,1 1 5 they provided the basis for
English claims of a legal right to wage wars of conquest based on the nature and
character of the enemy. Further, because that enemy was "uncivilized," the coloniz-
ers did not hold themselves to the laws of war to which they held "civilized" states.
Thus in 1637, English settlers from Connecticut, carrying with them an explicit
declaration of "offensive warr, "' i6 set out to attack a Pequot fort on the Mystic River,
where they had "formerly concluded to destroy them by the Sword and save the
Plunder."" 7 There was no debate here about the natural rights of the Indians to
dominion over their lands; their status as "savages" rendered them natural enemies,
against whom warfare was inevitable. In the words of one participant, "Many were
burnt in the fort, both men, women, and children. Others forced out... which our
soldiers received and entertained with the point of the sword. Down fell men,
women, and children ... 1 1 8 Between eight and nine hundred Pequots were ulti-
mately killed, leaving only a few dozen survivors,119 evidence, according to Captain
THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON: A JUSTIFICATION FOR PLANTING VIRGINIA 457
(S.M. Kingsbury ed., 1933)).
112. Id. at 217 (quoting THE REcoRDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY, supra note 112, at 556).
113. See George W. Bush, Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech to Employees at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 25 2001) in WE WILL PREVAIL, supra note 2, at 22 and Woods, supra note 22,
at 494-95.
114. SLOTKIN, supra note 67 at 38 (quoting William Bradford, Governor of the Plymouth Colony).
115. See id. at 42-56 (describing the actual culture in contrast to Bradford's depiction).
116. JENNINGS, supra note 106, at 217 (this declaration was the product of the General Court ofConnecti-
cut, the main legislative body of the Connecticut Colony, on May 1, 1637).
117. Id. at 221 (quoting their commander, Captain John Mason).
118. Id. at 223 (quoting the report of Saybrook Company commander, Captain John Underhill.) See also
DRINNON, supra note 26, at 41-45.
119. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 55.
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John Mason, that "was God pleased to smite our enemies" and "give us their Land
for an Inheritance."
1 20
The history of the early colonies is replete with similar illustrations of how the
settlers relied upon extant European international law, with its theories of discovery
and conquest, while simultaneously justifying their own deviations from this legal
framework by invoking a "higher" purpose, i.e., the implementation of their vision
of a "city on a hill" which would serve as a beacon of freedom, democracy, and
civilization for the New World. 2 Sometimes they emphasized the benefits of civili-
zation that would accrue to the Indians; at other times, the indigenous inhabitants
were simply portrayed as impediments to the settlers' God-given mission-"savages"
to be "extirpated" for the greater good. In Michael Hunt's words, "Secure in their
faith in liberty, Americans would set about remaking others in their image while the
world watched in awe."' 122 Variations of this theme have characterized American
exceptionalism throughout U.S. history, and continue to be seen in contemporary
U.S. policy.
IV. 18T CENTURY FOUNDING OF AN EXCEPTIONAL REPUBLIC
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the
political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws ofNature and of
Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that
they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
In Congress, July 4, 1776, The unanimous Declaration
ofthe thirteen united States ofAmerica ' 2 3
In laying the foundation for their war of independence, the American colonists
were making the radical claim that they, rather than the British Crown, possessed the
legal right to colonize North America as they deemed appropriate. 124 In three centu-
ries of European expansion, the legal framing of colonialism had been considerably
secularized, with sovereignty coming to be vested in the various European crowns
rather than the pope, but in no case had the colonists made the case that they, rather
than their Crown, independently possessed the right to possession and dominion
over "infidel" lands. 25 The American rebels were taking a position that violated
international law as it was recognized by the civilized world, for under the law of
120. Id. at 46 (quoting Captain John Mason). For a summary of such measures undertaken in North
America by various European powers, see Churchill, "Nits Make Lice," supra note 106 at 157-245.
121. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for
Debate, 28YALEJ. INT'LL. 551,557 (2003).
122. See id. (citing Michael H. Hunt, Ideology of National Greatness and Liberty, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 7 (Thomas G. Patterson ed., 1989).
123. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
124. On the contradictory arguments advanced by the colonists for rejecting British land claims in the
Americas while justifying their own, see WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 287-305.
125. See in/ra note 135.
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nations of that time, colonies certainly had no right to rebel. Thomas Grey says
bluntly, "The case for independence could not be made in legal terms."
1 2 6
One of the grievances cited by the American leaders was that the Crown was
invoking feudal powers in violation of rights guaranteed to the colonists under both
the British Constitution and the charters establishing the colonies. Thus, the litany
of complaints found in the Declaration of Independence focused on the King's
failure to pass or uphold laws needed by the colonies, or to allow their legislatures to
function, resulting in "a long train of abuses and usurpations" designed to subject the
colonists to "absolute Despotism." 1 27 The political theory of the emerging American
republic focused on the notion that the English system, which theoretically pre-
vented despotism by dividing governmental powers between the King, the House of
Lords, and the House of Commons, had broken down.1 28 It was asserted that the
"King's friends" had colluded with him to undermine the independence of Parlia-
ment, rendering the English system of checks and balances "farcical," to quote
Thomas Paine."2 9 The argument of the American rebels that they had a right under
natural law to choose their own government, in Robert Williams' words, "deployed
the mythology of the restless, freedom-loving Saxons to dramatize the continuity of
the Saxon struggle for natural rights now being played out on the American stage,"
depicting the King's abuse of his sovereign powers as "a wrongful continuation of the
perversion of Saxon principles of right and justice, traceable to the first imposition of
the Norman Yoke in 1066.
" 130
One of the primary motivating factors of the American Revolution was the Procla-
mation of 1763, issued by King George III in an attempt to limit the costs of
maintaining the colonies.1 3 1 The Proclamation prohibited English settlement, ex-
cept with explicit royal permission, in all lands west of the Allegheny and Appala-
chian mountains, promising the Indian nations that they would not be "molested or
disturbed" in lands they had not ceded or sold. 132 The Proclamation and the Stamp
Act, which was passed soon thereafter to fund it, marked the turning point in
126. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 890 (1978).
127. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 124,-at para. 2.
128. In turn, this was seen as destroying the heritage of the noble "race" of Saxons who were credited with
establishing democratic governance in England. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 267.
129. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A BIOGRAPHY 62-63 (1970)
(quoting Thomas Paine). While issues of taxation, trade, immigration and access to American Indian lands
were clearly motivating the signers, it is interesting to note how the bulk of their complaints are phrased in
terms of the King's refusal to comply with established processes of governance.
130. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 267 (summarizing Jefferson's arguments in a 1774 pamphlet entitled A
Summary View ofthe Rights ofBritish America, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
vlchl4slO.html).
131. See WILuiAMs, supra note 69, at 233-86; see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1790-1834 13-20 (1962)..The
Proclamation is reprinted in 3 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES
2135-39 (1979).
132. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 237 (quoting King George III of England, The Royal Proclamation of
1763, available at http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/proc63.htm ). See also WASHBURN, supra
note 132, ar2137.
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relations between the Crown and the colonists.133 From London's perspective, it was
perfectly reasonable to reach an agreement with the Indians to assure maximum
future profits, and to expect the colonies to shoulder some of the cost of their own
protection. For the colonists, this was an unacceptable limitation on their expansion-
ist visions, and an imposition of taxation without representation." 4 As articulated by
Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and other emerging American leaders, both the
1763 Proclamation and the Stamp Act disregarded the colonists' rights to self-
government, as established in the colonial charters, as well as "certain essential rights
of the British Constitution of government, which are founded in the law of God and
nature, and are the common rights of mankind."13 5
King George's assertion of jurisdiction over territory that had not been ceded or
purchased from the Indians reflected the British position that native land claims
would only be recognized to the extent that indigenous peoples remained in actual
possession of the land. As Robert Williams notes, sovereignty, and therefore "lawfid"
title, could only rest with the "English king whose subjects had discovered and laid
claim to that land, which was possessed not by Christian peoples but by infidels, who
lacked all rights and status in English legal colonizing theory."1 3 6 In contesting this,
the colonists relied on John Locke's articulation of natural law, in which the rights to
life and liberty were inseparable from that of property.1 37 Property rights, in turn,
were defined by the labor people put into improving, or dominating, nature.
1 3 8
In this construction, the Indians were idle, wandering savages. The colonists,
through their labor, would increase the value of indigenous "wastelands" many times
over, and because such actions benefited all of humanity, the settlers had not only a
right but an affirmative duty to possess and improve the land. 139 In international law,
a similar argument had also been made by Swiss theorist Emmerich de Vattel in his
1758 Le Droit de gens ou principe de la loi naturelle, in which he described the
cultivation of the land as not merely a right, but "an obligation imposed upon man
by nature."140 For Vattel, colonial conquest was not justified simply by the bringing
of civilization or Christianity to the colonized. Colonists also had an obligation to
appropriate and put to productive use the territory of those who "roamed" the-
133. See Churchill, Law Stood Squarely, supra note 90 at 670-71; WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 235-46.
134. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 235-46. On the expansion of this notion to the argument that the
British government had no right to impose any laws without representation, see Grey, supra note 127, at
884-90.
135. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 243 (quoting a resolution drafted by Samuel Adams and approved by the
Massachusetts House of Representatives on October 29, 1765). On the Stamp Act, see also Grey, supra note
127, at 875-82.
136. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 216.
137. On the importance of Locke to the ideology of the American Revolution, see Grey, supra note 127, at
860-61.
138. See WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 246-49. Williams emphasizes that Locke's philosophy was regarded
as "common sense" amongst the colonial leaders of this period.
139. See PAGDEN, supra note 64, at 77-78; WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 246-48.
140. PAGDEN, supra note 64, at 78 (quoting EMERIC DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DE GENS OU PRINCIPE DE LA
LOI NATURELLE (1758)). On Vattel's influence on American thinking, see also Grey, supra note 127 at 862-63.
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land. 141 The law invoked by the settlers in rejecting British attempts to restrict their
expansion was thus a combination of the legal theories developed by European
powers over centuries of colonial expansion and the colonists' assertion that they
represented good, in the form of God's will, which would inevitably prevail over evil.
The available legal framework, however, did not provide for the formation of an
independent state, for it only addressed the rights of the colonizers in their relations
with other colonial powers and with respect to those being colonized. To justify
forming an independent state in violation of otherwise applicable international law,
the founding fathers accused the King of violating the law of nations and acting in a
barbarous manner "unworthy the Head of a civilized nation."' 42 In asserting their
right under natural law to rebel under these conditions, however, the colonial leaders
were not prepared to recognize a similar right for American Indians to self-
determination.14 3 This is evident in the Declaration of Independence's castigation of
the King for leaving the colonists unprotected against "the merciless Indian Savages
whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and
conditions." 14 4 As John Wunder notes, from the American Indian perspective, the
Declaration of Independence was "perceived... as both a cruel myth and a dire,
geopolitical statement of purpose."
1 45
Thus, the United States was created as a state of exception with respect to the law
of nations. Its founders justified their break with British colonial rule by claiming
that their independent government more faithfully represented the underlying prin-
ciples of natural law including the protection of democratic self-rule.1 46 Simulta-
neously, however, they asserted their superior rights as colonizers, claiming in essence
to be better representatives of civilization than Britain. They denounced King George
for treating them as colonial subjects rather than actors, and invoked the very ration-
ales for colonial expansion provided by then-extant international law to justify their
appropriation of the colonial territory. In so doing, the founders replicated many of
141. See PAGDEN, supra note 64, at 78-79. This rationale was invoked by Justice Marshall in 1831, when
he claimed that "the law of nations" would regard "Indian tribes" not as states but "as nothing more than
wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or government,
beyond what is required in a savage state." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 19 (1831).
142. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 123, at para. 3.
143. The political ideology of both the American and French revolutions emphasized a right to self-
determination. See B.C. NIRMAL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-29
(1999). However, the right of colonized peoples to self-determination only began to be recognized in the
aftermath of World War I and then only in extremely limited form and with respect to the colonies of the
defeated powers. See id., 31-36; see also ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 115-95 (discussing the mandate system of
the League of Nations); HuRsT HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFIICTING RIGHTS 27-49 (1990).
144. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 123, at para. 3.
145. John R. Wunder, "Merciless Indian Savages" and the Declaration of Independence: Natvie Americans
Translate the Ecunnaunuxulgee Document, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 66 (2000-2001). According to Wunder,
the founders of the United States "are known as the 'Ecunnaunuxulgee' to the Creeks of Georgia, meaning
those 'people greedily grasping after the lands of red people."' Id.
146. See Jordan J. Paust, The Human Right to Participate in Armed Revolution and Related Forms of Social
Violence: Testing the Limits of Permissibility, 32 EMORY L.J. 545, 550-61 (1983) (describing the "right to
revolution" articulated by the American colonists).
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the arguments advanced by the Puritans and other early English settlers for the
establishment of their colonies and, as will be briefly illustrated in the following
section, similar justifications were provided for the continued extension of U.S.
territorial claims and military actions.
V. 19T CENTURY CLAIM TO A MANIFEST DESTINY
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery, exploration, settlement,
contiguity, etc... . [The American claim] is by the right of our manifest destiny to
overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for
the development of the great experiment of liberty and federative self government
entrusted to us. 147
John O'Sullivan, 1845
The phrase "manifest destiny," coined by attorney John O'Sullivan in 1845,
quickly gained immense popularity.1 48 According to historian Frederick Merk, its
"postulates were that Anglo-Saxons are endowed as a race with innate superiority,
that Protestant Christianity holds the keys to Heaven, that only republican forms of
political organization are free, that the future- even the predestined future- can be
hurried along by human hands, and that the means of hurrying it, if the end be good,
need not be inquired into too closely.' 149 This understanding of the American
mission clearly resonated with the vision articulated by the Puritans and with the new
Republic's plans for continental expansion. In 1783, George Washington had de-
scribed the United States as a "rising empire," and both future president John Adams
and his cousin Samuel believed that Canada would have to be incorporated into the
Union.1 50 According to Thomas Jefferson, writing in 1786, "our confederacy must
be viewed as the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled."
15 1
The origins of the concept of manifest destiny can be traced to the Puritans' belief
that "God had made them custodians of democracy and that they had a mis-
sion.., to spread its principles."' 52 Despite widespread acceptance among the pub-
lic that, as Merk noted, "if the end be good, [the means] need not be inquired into
too closely,"' 53 American leaders consistently have attempted to frame their realiza-
tion of this destiny in legally acceptable terms. In this process we see the utilization
of the same explanations that were advanced in the settlers' early encounters with
American Indians-and are currently being invoked in the war on terror-for viola-
147. FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A REINTERPRETATION
32-33 (Greenwood Press 1987) (1963) (quoting John L. O'Sullivan, Column, N.Y. MORNING NEws (Dec.
27, 1845)).
148. Shortly after the publication of O'Sullivan's column, Massachusetts Congressman, Robert C.
'Winthrop, referred to the phrase in Congress and it was soon widely referenced in popular discourse. See
HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 220.
149. MERK, supra note 148, at 265. Merk's seminal work outlines the emergence of the concept in great
detail. However, he explicitly declines to draw any connections between race and manifest destiny. See id.
150. SIDNEY LENS, THE FORGING OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 2 (Pluto Press 2003) (1971).
151. Id.
152. RODOLFO AcufJA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 13 (3d ed. 1988) (1972).
153. See MERK, supra note 148, at 26 5.
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tions of, or exemption from, accepted standards of international law. This section
will provide a few illustrative examples.
A. Legitimizing the Appropriation ofAmerican Indian Lands
The American colonial legal paradigm was consolidated by the Supreme Court in
a series of cases authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, himself the beneficiary of
western land claims. 154 In the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck, the Court recognized the
validity of a 1795 sale by Georgia of lands on its western frontier, thus acknowledg-
ing that Georgia's claims had not been extinguished by the Proclamation of 1763.155
Marshall framed the issue in terms of state versus federal ownership of "vacant
lands." Any claims the Indians may have had to that territory under natural law were
disregarded on the theory that uncultivated land was "wasteland" which could be
rightfully appropriated by those who would put it to "productive" use.
1 56
Subsequent Marshall opinions directly and explicitly denied native legal rights.
The first, Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, decided in 1823, was a title dispute
between two settlers, one of whom claimed to have purchased the land in question
directly from its indigenous owners.15 7 In order to establish that individuals could
only obtain land from the state, Marshall declared that because the doctrine of
discovery restricted the right of competing European powers to negotiate with the
native inhabitants for purchase of the land, it also restricted those inhabitants from
selling to anyone other than the "discovering" power. 158 On that basis, the Chief
Justice concluded that indigenous peoples did not have absolute (and therefore
alienable) title, but only the rights of occupancy and possession.159 Acknowledging
that his logic might appear "extravagant"-and ignoring the fact that most American
Indian land had not, for the most part, been taken by conquest-Marshall as much
as conceded that he was abandoning law in favor of raw power: "Conquest gives a
title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and
speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted." 
160
The 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia addressed whether the state of
Georgia could exercise jurisdiction over Cherokee lands.16 1 The issue, however, was
not decided because Marshall held that the Cherokees did not constitute a "foreign
154. John Marshall and his father had each received scrip for 10,000 acres of land in what is now
Kentucky, issued by the U.S. government in lieu of payment to troops during the war for independence.
Ultimately, they jointly acquired more than 200,000 acres of western lands. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN
MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 74-75 (1996).
155. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 69,308-09.
156. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142.
157. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543.
158. Id. at 573-574.
159. Id. at 574.
160. Id. at 587. See also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 209,248 (1984). SeeChurchill, Law Stood Squarely, supra note 90, at 673-75.
161. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
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nation" and, therefore, did not have standing to sue in federal court.' 62 Although the
United States recognized the sovereignty of American Indian nations, including the
Cherokees, by entering into numerous treaties with them, Marshall unilaterally
assigned all indigenous nations a unique and lesser status. He declared, "They may,
more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy
a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will .... Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."' 
63
Addressing the question most central to the legitimacy of the United States,
Justice Marshall was asserting a jurisprudential version of American exceptionalism.
International law is at the heart of the dispute in both Johnson and Cherokee Nation,
but is applied in an extremely inconsistent manner. Marshall relies on the doctrine of
discovery, yet disregards the distinction Vitoria made between occupied and unoccu-
pied lands and his articulation of the rights of indigenous peoples under natural
law.1 64 In justifying U.S. hegemony in terms of "conquest," he similarly disregards
the parameters of just warfare well established in the law of nations.1 65 As Justice
Thompson, dissenting in Cherokee Nation, emphasizes, Marshall's conclusion that
American Indian nations were not sovereign states was clearly at odds with interna-
tional law.
1 66
Justice Marshall could have chosen to acknowledge that Indians, like all other
human beings, had rights universally cognizable under extant law. He could have
held that a country that bases its claim to independence on overturning feudal law in
favor of a natural law enshrining freedom and democracy has an obligation to abide
by that higher law. Instead, Marshall reverted to arguments based upon the inherent
superiority of Western civilization, describing American Indians a "an anomaly un-
known to the books that treat of states, and which the law of nations would regard as
nothing more than wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit,
and having neither laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state."
1 67
Thus, the arguments underlying American exceptionalism were entrenched in U.S.
jurisprudence, and have been continually invoked to justify federal policy to the
present day. 
168
162. Id. at 74.
163. Id. Ward Churchill concludes, "In practical "effect, Marshall cast indigenous nations as entities
inherently imbued with a sufficient measure of sovereignty to alienate their territory by treaty when and
wherever the U.S. desired they do so, but never with enough to refuse." Churchill, Law Stood Squarely, supra
note 90, at 677-78.
164. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
166. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 52-54 (citing extensively to Vattel).
167. Id. at 27-28. See generally Watson, supra note 64, at 499-540.
168. Seegenerally Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine ofDiscovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 1
(2005). (discussing how the doctrine continues to be applied in American law). See generally Liam Seamus
O'Melinn, The Imperial Origins of Federal Indian Law: The Ideology of Colonization in Britain, Ireland, and
America 31 ARuz. ST. L.J. 1207 (1999) (articulating the roots of this jurisprudence in European colonial
thought).
[Vol. 1:67
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
B. Consolidating a Continental Base From Florida to Mexico
As the United States expanded its territorial claims to encompass the lower forty-
eight states of the Union, it faced the legal and military issues of appropriating lands
not only from indigenous peoples, but also from other European colonial powers. In
this context U.S. officials justified their actions with variants of familiar arguments
creating exemptions from otherwise applicable international law.
The "Louisiana Purchase" of 1803 more than doubled United States' territory,
opening up western lands for the relocation of American Indians living east of the
Mississippi. 169 Within a few years, the U.S. Congress, pressured by southern slave-
holders who resented the refuge Spain provided to runaway slaves,17 o agreed in secret
to acquire Spanish-controlled Florida.17 ' After several unsuccessful attempts at inva-
sion, white settlers and adventurers occupied land in Florida and declared themselves
a "republic," hoping for recognition and protection by the United States.17 2 Their
uprisings, however, were defeated by Black and Indian forces, leading Andrew Jack-
son to initiate the first of three wars against the Seminole nation.
1 73
Echoing the rhetoric of other "Indian wars," Jackson's May 1818 "Proclamation
on Taking Possession of Pensacola" accused the Seminoles of engaging in "all the
horrors of savage massacre" and asserted that since the Spanish had not fulfilled their
obligation to prevent such atrocities, "the immutable laws of self defence, therefore
compelled the American Government to take possession of such part of the Floridas
in which the Spanish authority could not be maintained." 174 Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams supported Jackson's actions, which included a massacre of Seminole
noncombatants, as "defensive acts of hostility," noting that it was acceptable to
commit brutal acts against "a ferocious nation which observes no rules."' 75 In other
words, because the enemy was uncivilized, the United States was not bound to
comply with otherwise applicable laws of war. Spain was unable to effectively counter
169. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 125 (1980).
170. In 1693 the King had issued an order freeing fugitive slaves and in 1704 the Spanish governor of
Florida announced that "[a]ny negro of Carolina, Christian or not, free or slave, who wishes to come fugitive,
will be [given] complete liberty." KEVIN MULROY, FREEDOM ON THE BORDER: THE SEMINOLE MAROONS IN
FLORIDA, THE INDIAN TERRITORY, COAHUILA, AND TEXAS 8 (1993) (quoting the 1704 Proclamation of
Governor Jos6 de Zuniga y Cerda). The Seminole nation, formed in the mid-1700s by native peoples and
escaped African slaves and their descendants, vigorously resisted U.S. incursions. See generally JOSHUA R.
GIDDINGS, THE EXILES OF FLORIDA OR, THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY OUR GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE
MAROONS, WHO FLED FROM SOUTH CAROLINA AND OTHER SLAVE STATES SEEKING PROTECTION UNDER
SPANISH LAWS (1858).
171. See KENNETH W. PORTER, THE BLACK SEMINOLES: HISTORY OF A FREEDOM-SEEKING PEOPLE 3
(Alcione M. Amos & Thomas P. Senter eds., 1996). See also David P. Currie, Rumors of Wars: Presidential and
Congressional War Powers, 1809-1829, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000). See generally JOSEPH BURKHOLDER
SMITH, THE PLOT TO STEAL FLORIDA: JAMES MADISON'S PHONY WAR (1983).
172. MERK, supra note 14 8, at 7.
173. See Natsu Taylor Saito, From Slavey and Seminoles to AIDS in South Africa: An Essay on Race and
Property in International Law, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1135, 1150-60 (2000) (providing a brief summary of the first
war against the Seminole nation). On the Second Seminole War, one of the longest and most expensive waged
by the United States, see GIDDINGS, supra note 171 at 315. See also PORTER, supra note 172 at 106-07.
174. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 106-07 (quoting Andrew Jackson, Proclamation on Taking Possession
of Pensacola, May 29, 1818). See also NoAM CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOCRACY 35 (1991).
175. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 104, 111 (quotingJohn QuincyAdams).
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the rising U.S. military power and quickly agreed to cede its claims to Florida for five
million dollars.' 
76
Expansion into Mexico soon followed. Longstanding attempts to extend U.S.
territory to the Rio Grande had been resisted consistently by the Spanish govern-
ment. Nonetheless, by the time Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1822,
American settlers were already moving into what would become Texas.177 These
colonists were reluctant to comply with Mexican laws, especially after Mexico abol-
ished slavery in 1829,178 and they lobbied for Texas to be recognized as an indepen-
dent republic. Again, expansion was often couched in terms of extending American
freedoms. Rejecting the terms of an 1819 treaty in which the U.S. had relinquished
claims to Mexico, James Long led an unsuccessful attempt to establish the "Republic
of Texas,"179 and in 1826 Hayden Edwards seized the town of.Nacogdoches and
announced the creation of the "Republic of Fredonia." When the revolt was sup-
pressed, U.S. newspapers described the insurgents as "apostles of democracy crushed
by an alien civilization."1 8 ° The Mexican government banned further immigration
to Texas in 1830, but failed to stem the tide of U.S. settlers,18 1 who "saw themselves
in danger of becoming the alien subjects of a people to whom they deliberately
believed themselves morally, intellectually, and politically superior."'
82
Eventually Texas was successfully occupied and recognized by the United States as
an independent republic.' 83 Soon thereafter, Americans were actively debating the
acquisition of both Oregon and the rest of Mexico. John O'Sullivan was addressing
the Oregon question in his 1845 editorial which popularized the phrase "manifest
destiny," but earlier that year he had used it to criticize Mexico for allegedly interfer-
ing in U.S. affairs with "the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering
our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest
destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development
176. GIDDINGS, supra note 171, at 59. See also U.S. v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) for Chief
Justice John Marshall's acknowledgment that the United States thereby obtained approximately thirty million
acres of land. Immediately thereafter, in 1823, the United States proclaimed, in what came to be known as the
Monroe Doctrine, that the Americas were no longer open to colonization by Europe, but it did not similarly
constrain itself). See MERK, supra note 148, at 17, 204, 206, 220.
177. By 1830, approximately 20,000 Anglo settlers and 2,000 of their slaves lived in Texas. ACUfqA, supra
note 153, at7.
178. The settlers circumvented this restriction by declaring their slaves "free" and then signing them to
lifelong contracts as indentured servants. Id. See also RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, AN EMPIRE FOR SLAVERY: THE
PECULIAR INSTITUTION IN TExAs, 1821-1865 23-24 (1989).
179. ACUiA, supra note 153, at 6; see also RICHARD W. VAN AISTYNE, THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE
101 (1974).
180. ACURA, supra note 153, at 7 (citing T.R. FEHRENBACH, LONE STAR: A HISTORY OF TEXAS AND THE
TEXANS 163-64 (1968)).
181. MERK, supra note 148, at 20-21 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 25-351, at 313-14 (1838)). See also ACU&fA,
supra note 153, at 7 (noting that Sam Houston, prot g6 of Andrew Jackson, led a "war party" that rioted over
customs duties in 1831 and launched an unsuccessful attack on a Mexican military garrison the following
year). See also FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 89
(David J. Weber ed., 1973).
182. EUGENE C. BARKER, MEXICO AND TEXAS, 1821-1835 148 (1965) (1928).
183. ACUfJA, supra note 153, at 11-13.
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of our yearly multiplying millions. '184 In December 1845, Texas was incorporated
into the Union. Soon thereafter the Mexican government broke off diplomatic
relations with the U.S. and President Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to "pro-
tect the border." U.S. troops were sent into a contested strip of land resulting, quite
predictably, in an incident used to justify war on the grounds that Mexico had
"invaded American territory and shed American blood upon the American soil."
18 5
* Like many subsequent U.S. military ventures, including the recent invasion of
Iraq, the war with Mexico was portrayed as an attempt to bring the "American
values" of freedom and democracy to oppressed peoples. As Reginald Horsman puts
it, "The sentiment that the United States' flag would be the flag of the world when
tyranny had perished was a common one, and many united in conceiving of the
invasion as a war of liberation .... A New York poet in May 1846 conjured up an
image of Mexicans joyously shouting 'The Saxons are coming, our freedom is
nigh."' 6 Although often portrayed as an easy victory for the vastly superior Ameri-
can military, it was, in fact, a brutal war in which Mexican forces fiercely contested
their "liberation" and, again, the laws of war were often disregarded. Huge areas of
major cities were leveled by indiscriminate shelling, prisoners of war were executed,
houses and fields burned, and civilians terrorized. 18 7 According to an 1846 Cincin-
nati newspaper editorial, these violations were not a problem considering the charac-
ter of the enemy: "Though the barbarians fall thick as hail, still, as their disposition is
warlike and as the slaughter of their armies by the superiority of scientific warfare and
the unflinching bravery of men disposed to peace, would teach them healthful les-
sons, the loss of a few thousand of them would not be so deplorable."18 8
Reflecting both early American settlers' justifications for the appropriation of
Indian lands and their rationale for independence, the New York Morning News
framed the conquest as an exercise of freedom for the settlers: "To say that the
184. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 219 (quoting John L. O'Sullivan).
185. Juan F. Perea, A BriefHistory of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing.the Trajectories of Con-
quest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 287-88 (2003) (quoting statement of James K. Polk in FOREIGNERS THEIR
NATIVE LAND, supra note 182, at 95); see also ACuNA, supra note 153, at 12-13; ZINN, supra note 170, at
147-52. Ulysses S. Grant later wrote that he believed Polk had provoked the war and that the annexation of
Texas had been an act of aggression saying, "I had a horror of the Mexican War...only I had not moral
courage enough to resign." AcUNA, supra note 153, at 13 (quoting statement ofAndrewJackson quoted in To
MEXICO WITH TAYLOR AND SCOTT, 1845-1847 3 (Grady McWhitney & Sue McWhitney eds., 1969)).
Abraham Lincoln, then a member of Congress, also believed the war was "unnecessarily and unconstitution-
ally commenced by the President" but nonetheless voted to fund it. ZINN, supra note 170, at 151 (quoting
Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the House of Representatives in Support of the Candidacy of Zachary Taylor for
President (July 27, 1848)).
186. HoRSMAN, supra note 67, at 233 (quoting William M'Carty).
187. See ACU&A, supra note 153, at 16; see also ZINN, supra note 170, at 163-65 (noting that in two days
1300 shells were fired into Vera Cruz hitting, among other things, a hospital, and whole blocks of Mexico
City were destroyed).
188. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 236 (quoting The Casket (Cincinnati), May 13, 1846, at 37; June 10,
1846, at 69). One is reminded of the former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeline Albright's response to
U.N. reports that economic sanctions on Iraq had, by 1996, resulted in the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children:
"[T]his is a very hard choice, but...we think the price is worth it." ARUNDHATI Roy, THE ALGEBRA OF
INFINITE JUSTICE 200 (2002) (quoting 60 Minutes: Hunting Saddam (CBS television broadcast May 12,
1996)).
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settlement of a fertile and unappropriated soil by right of individual purchase is the
aggression of a government is absurd .'. . An inalienable right of man is to institute
for themselves that form of government which suits them best, and to change it when
they please."' 89 Thus, measures recognized as illegal under the prevailing interna-
tional law were condoned. As it was bluntly acknowledged in a New York Morning
News editorial of October 1845:
We are contiguous to a vast portion of the globe, untrodden save by the savage and
the beast, and we are conscious of our power to render it tributary to man. This is a
position which must give existence to a public law, the axioms of which a Pufen-
dorf or Vattel had no occasion to discuss. So far as the disposition to disregard mere
conventional claims is taken into account, the acquisition of Texas... may be
admitted at once, to be aggressive.
190
Again, an exemption was carved out for U.S. practices based not only on the
"uncivilized" character of the enemy, but the higher purpose of extending American
civilization. The editorial continued, "But what then? It has been laid down and
acted upon, that the solitudes of America are the property of the immigrant childrien
of Europe and their offspring."191 As its authors explained, "This national policy,
necessity or destiny, we know to be just and beneficent, and we can, therefore, afford
to scorn the invective and imputations of rival nations." 192
By 1848, with victory imminent, the debate within the United States turned to
how much of Mexico should be annexed and who was to be an American. Florida
Senator James D. Westcott vigorously protested the notion of being "compelled to
receive not merely the white citizens of California and New Mexico, but the peons,
negroes, and Indians... and other half-monkey savages... as equal citizens of the
United States."' 9 3 On the other side, according to Horsman, "arguments claiming
that large areas of Mexico could safely be annexed were based on the twin assump-
tions that the largely Indian Mexicans would fade away, and that the American
Anglo-Saxons were destined to outbreed the whole world." 14 The issue was resolved
by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, under which Mexico ceded "only" the
least populated northern third of its territory. 95
189. See MERK, supra note 148, at 22-23 (quoting Editorial, The Popular Movement, N. Y. MORNING
NEWs, May 24, 1845).
190. Id. at 25 (quoting Editorial, N. Y. MORNING NEws, Oct. 13, 1845).
191. Id.
192. Id. For a summary of the conquest of Mexico framed in terms of manifest destiny, see Gloria
Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-ConjaYting Latinoslas' Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHIcANO-LATiNO L.
REv. 69,97-110 (1998).
193. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 276 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 48-49 (1848)).
There was widespread agreement among Anglo-Americans that the Mexicans "had inherited the worst quali-
ties of Spaniards and Indians to produce a 'race' still more despicable than that of either parent." FOREIGNERS
IN THEIR NATIVE LAND, supra note 182, at 60; see also Perea, supra note 186, at 292.
194. HORSMAN, supra note 67, at 243. See also Perea, supra note 186, at 293-95; MERK, supra note 148, at
191-92.
195. Perea, supra note 186, at 294-95 (noting that this northern third, when combined with Texas,
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C. Imperial Expansion: Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico
As concern increased over the incorporation of territories with large non-white
populations, the American vision of encompassing the hemisphere-"continental-
ism"-was replaced by a more explicitly imperialist vision of extended political,
military and/or economic power.1 96 Frederick Merk notes that continentalism, which
focused on extending the Union and its principles of representative government, was
necessarily limited to Euro-derivative peoples and, therefore, imperialism became the
means of extending U.S. power to far-flung colonies whose peoples, by virtue of their
incapacity to civilize, precluded annexation.1 97 By the late 1880s internal resistance
from indigenous nations was all but crushed and domestic markets were becoming
saturated. I98 These factors encouraged U.S. commercial and military interests to
focus on the Pacific and, in particular, the Kingdom of Hawaii.
At that time, U.S. relations with Hawaii were clearly governed by the international
law. As Congress would acknowledge in 1993, "between 1826 and 1893 the United
States recognized the independence of the kingdom of Hawaii, extended full and
complete recognition of the Hawaiian Government, and entered into treaties and
conventions with the Hawaiian monarchs." 199 Nonetheless, following the precedent
set in Florida and Texas, American settlers moved in, displacing Native Hawaiians,
restructuring the economy, and appropriating political power.20° In January 1893 a
well-armed "committee" of U.S. citizens, backed by Marines to "assist in preserving
public order," took over government buildings in Honolulu and installed a "provi-
sional government," forcing Queen Lili'uokalani to step down.20 1 Although Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland subsequently called the coup an "unprovoked act of war" and
a gross violation of "international morality," he refused the Queen's repeated re-
resulted in a total loss for Mexico of about half its territory). See generally Richard Griswold del Castillo,
Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
31(1998).
196. Because of the "national reluctance to add peoples of mixed blood to a blood that was pure .... conti-
nentalism was allowed to die, and... another concept had to be devised to take its place." MERK, supra note
148, at 227.
197. Id. at256-57.
198. See ZINN, supra note 170, at 290 (noting that in 1890 the U.S. government deemed the internal
frontier to be closed). Celebrating the massacre at Wounded Knee, which occurred that same year, L. Frank
Baum, author of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, declared, "The nobility of the Redskin is extinguished .... The
Whites, by law of conquest, by justice of civilization, are masters of the American continent, and the best
safety of the frontier settlements will be secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians." 2
ELLIOTT J. GoRN, RANDY ROBERTS & TERRY D. BILHARTZ, CONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN PAST: A
SOURCE BOOK OF A PEOPLE'S HISTORY 71 (Bruce D. Borland ed., HarperCollins College Publishers 1995)
(1972) (quoting L. Frank Baum, Editorial, ABERDEEN SATURDAY PIONEER, Dec. 20, 1890).
199. WARD CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW
app. at 408 (2003) (reproducing Congressional Apology to Native Hawaiians, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat.
1510 (1993)).
200, See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I
4-20 (1993), for an overview of this process in Hawaii. See generally ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY: THE RECORD OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS HAwAIIANS (Ward Churchill & Sharon H.
Venne eds., 2004), for a comprehensive accounting of this history.
201. See TRASK, supra note 201, at 16-21. See generally HELENA G. ALLEN, THE BETRAYAL OF QUEEN
LILI'UOKALANI: LAST QUEEN OF HAWAII, 1838-1917 281-94 (1982).
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quests to reinstate her and restore the rule of law,202 instead recognizing the new
Republic of Hawaii as a lawful State.2° 3
In the acquisition of Hawaii, as with the annexation of northern Mexico, the
primary question for U.S. leaders was not the legality of the invasion but the incorpo-
ration of territory with a predominantly non-white population.2" 4 Theodore Roos-
evelt argued that the United States' failure to immediately annex Hawaii was "a
crime against white civilization. "205 South Dakota Senator Richard F. Pettigrew,
however, was more concerned about the effect it would have on maintaining an
Anglo-American model of freedom and democracy:
The founders of this government.., made it an unwritten law that no areas
should be brought within the bounds of the Republic which did not, and could
not, sustain a race equipped in all essentials for the maintenance of free civilization
..... Therefore, if we adopt the policy of acquiring tropical countries, where repub-
lics cannot live, we overturn the theory upon which this Government is estab-
lished.20 6
This led, in July 1898, to Congress' decision not to incorporate the islands, but to
hold them as a "permanent trust territory of the United States," a colonial status that
changed only in the wake of the decolonization movement which followed World
War 11.
2 0 7
Pettigrew's statement reflects the tension between the United States' justification
of continued expansion on the basis that it would bring civilization and freedom to
those deemed Other and the conviction of many U.S. leaders that Others were
racially incapable of civilization. Such debates resurfaced in 1898 as the U.S. consid-
ered its options with respect to territories "ceded" by Spain in the Spanish-American
War. After the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor, President McKinley
announced that Spain's inability to protect the Maine had moved him "to secure in
202. President Grover Cleveland, Message to the Congress (Dec. 18, 1893), reprinted in A CALL FOR
HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 25-46 (Michael Kioni Dudley & Keoni Kealoha Agard eds., 1990); see also SAMUEL
P. WEAVER, HAWAII, USA 103 (1959).
203. WILLIAM ADAM Russ, JR., THE HAWAIIAN REPUBLIC AND ITS STRUGGLE TO WIN ANNEXATION
(1894-98) 37 (2d ed. 1992).
204. Carl Schurz, a European immigrant, wrote in Harper's Magazine in 1893:
Their population, according to the census of 1890, consists of 34,436 natives, 6,186 half castes,
7,495 born in Hawaii of foreign parents, 15,301 Chinese, 12,360 Japanese, 8,602 Portuguese,
1,982 Americans ... and other foreigners. If there ever was a population unfit to constitute a State
of the American Union, it is this.
MERK, supra note 148, at 243. Schurz also objected to annexing Cuba because Cubans were comparable to
Mexicans. Id.
205. ZINN, supra note 170, at 293.
206. MERK, supra note 148, at 244. See also STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, "BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION":
THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 15-16 (1982). See also ACT OF WAR: THE
OVERTHROW OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION (Na Maka o ka 'Aina 1993), for a documentary that captures the
debate graphically.
207. MERK, supra note 148, at 255-56. On July 7, 1898, President McKinley signed the Joint Resolution
To provide for the annexing of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. J. Res. 55, 55th Cong. (1898)
(enacted).
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the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order
and observing its international obligations, ensuring peace and tranquility and the
security of its citizens as well as our own. "208 According to Philip Foner, however, by
that point Cuban rebels had been struggling for independence for three years and
McKinley was concerned that "if the United States waited too long, the Cuban
revolutiohary forces would emerge victorious, replacing the collapsing Spanish re-
gime. ' 2
0 9
Although McKinley was informed by the U.S. representative in Madrid that the
Spanish government had all but capitulated to American demands, he obtained
congressional authority to use military force to "end hostilities" on the island in April
1898.210 As Richard Drinnon notes, McKinley's stated reasons for intervening in
Cuba paralleled those articulated by John Quincy Adams in his defense of Andrew
Jackson's 1818 invasion of Florida:
As with the "derelict province" of Florida, Spanish officials had allowed revolu-
tionary Cuba to become a colony of "barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and hor-
rible miseries." In both colonies there had been the same "wanton destruction of
property," the same chaotic conditions that invoked the "necessities of self-
defence" for the United States; or, as McKinley put it, "the present condition of
affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace." ... [Both McKinley and Ad-
ams] spoke and acted "in the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, [and]
in behalf of endangered American interests.
2 1 1
Spain put up little resistance and soon agreed to cede control over Cuba, Puerto
Rico, the Philippines, and Guam to the United States in exchange for $20 mil-
lion.2 12 The peace treaty provided that the "civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter-
mined by the Congress. "213
In April 1898 Congress had disclaimed any intent to annex Cuba and therefore,
instead of taking direct possession of the island, the U.S. sent in troops to ensure
"stability" and protect American investments.214 This military force was only with-
drawn after the Cubans agreed under pressure to incorporate constitutional provi-
sions that dramatically limited their sovereignty. The new constitution prevented
208. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 269-70.
209. Quoted.in ZINN, supra note 170, at 296.
210. MERK, supra note 148, at 250.
211. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 269.
212. Treaty of Peace beteeen the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec.
10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter U.S.-Spain Treaty]. See also ZINN, supra note 169, at 302 (noting that no
Cuban, Puerto Rican, Filipino or Chamorro was allowed to participate in the negotiations concerning the
surrender or the terms of the treaty).
213. U.S.-Spain Treaty, supra note 213, art. DC. See also MERK, supra note 148, at 254 ("Inoffensively and
inconspicuously a principle was thus adopted, new to the Constitution and revolutionary-the principle that
peoples not candidates for equal statehood in the Union were annexed and their status as colonial subjects left
to Congress. This was imperialism.").
214. See ZINN, supra note 170, at 303 (estimating the amount of U.S. capital invested during the occupa-
tion to be $30 million).
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Cuba from entering into treaties that might impair its independence. Of course, the
U.S. exempted itself from this requirement, insisting that the Cubans enter into
treaties which provided for the leasing of coaling or naval stations to U.S. and gave
the U.S. a right to intervene at its discretion to "maintain orderly government." 
5
The day after Spain sued for peace, future secretary of state John Hay promptly
declared the conflict to have been a "splendid little war."216 What he failed to
understand was that even though Cuba had been taken quickly, the United States
would be mired in a lengthy war, neither little nor splendid, to pacify the Philippines,
another territory ceded by Spain. Despite having ordered Commodore George Dewey
to destroy the Spanish fleet in the Far East as soon as hostilities commenced,
u17
President McKinley later claimed that he had not wanted the Philippines "when they
came to us as a gift from the gods," and that only after pacing the floor and praying
"night after night" did he receive the word from "Almighty God... [t]hat there was
nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift
and civilize and Christianize them." '18 Apparently, however, as Howard Zinn put it,
"[tihe Filipinos did not get the same message from God"2" 9 and the war continued
until 1906, during which time perhaps a million Filipinos were slaughtered.2"'
As in the war with Mexico, the United States widely disregarded international law
215. MERK, supra note 148, at 258; see also ZINN, supra note 170, at 304-05. In 1934, in accordance with
Franklin Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy, these conditions were replaced by a treaty canceling all of the
United States' special rights except the lease of the naval base at Guantinamo Bay. See MERK, supra note 148,
at 258; see also Christopher J. Schatz & Noah A. F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice Denied? Crisis
Jurisprudence, the Guantdnamo Detainees, and the Imperiled Role of Habeas Corpus in CurbingAbusive Govern-
mentDetention, 11 LEWIs & CLARK L. REv. 539, 559-62 (2007) (discussing the continued U.S. occupation of
the base); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the lease
term is "indefinite and at the discretion of the United States" and, therefore, "[firom a practical perspective
... has produced a place that belongs to the United States").
216. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 269 (quoting John Hay).
217. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 279-80 (noting that the orders were issued prior to the explosion aboard
the U.S.S. Maine, the claimed cause of the war).
218. DRINNON, supra note 26, at 279 (quoting President William McKinley); ZINN, supra note 170, at
305-06. See also MILLER, supra note 207, at 13-15 (discussing the genuine reluctance ofAmerican imperialists
to acquire a densely populated colony).
219. ZINN, supra note 170, at 306.
220. See THE PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM, DICTATORSHIP,
AND RESISTANCE 19 (Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen Rosskamm Shalom eds., 1987):
How many Filipinos died resisting American aggression? ... The figure of 250,000 crops up in
various works; one suspects it is chosen and repeated in ignorance .... Records of the killing were
not kept and the Americans were anxious to suppress true awareness of the extent of the slaughter
.... How many died of disease and the effects of concentration camp life is even more difficult to
assess. [Major General Franklin J.] Bell, who, one imagines might be in as good a position to judge
such matters as anyone, estimated in a [May 1901] New York Times interview that over 600,000
people in Luzon alone had been killed or had died of disease as a result of the war .... Bell did not
include the effect of the Panay campaign, the Samar Campaign, or his own bloodthirsty Batangas
campaign (where at least 100,000 died) ... Nor could [his estimate] include the "post-war" pe-
riod .... A million deaths? ... Such an estimate ... might conceivably err on the side of
understatement.
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for the "higher good" of civilization. 22 1 A year after the U.S. invasion, General
William Shafter was predicting that "[i] t may be necessary to kill half the Filipinos in
order that the remaining half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of
life than their present semi-barbarous state affords." 2 2 2 In April 1901, the Philadel-
phia Ledger reported, "The present war is no bloodless, opera bouffe engagement; our
men have been relentless, have killed to exterminate men, women, children, prison-
ers and captives, active insurgents and suspected people from lads of ten up, the idea
prevailing that the Filipino as such was little better than a dog .... "223 Nonetheless,
the United States maintained the view, proclaimed by President McKinley in 1898,
that the United States' "paramount aim" was "to win the confidence, respect, and
affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way
that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free
peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of
BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION substituting the mild sway of justice and right
for arbitrary rule."
2 24
In Puerto Rico, also ceded by Spain to the United States in 1898, resistance was
more limited than in the Philippines. The United States quickly established a mili-
tary government, and then a colonial civil government.2 25 This did not mean, how-
ever, that the legal issues were less complicated. The Supreme Court addressed
Puerto Rico's status in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases, in which the
justices extended the arguments used by Justice Marshall in the 1820s and 1830s
from American Indians to the United States' newly acquired overseas possessions.2 26
Efren Rivera Ramos summarizes Justice Brown's opinion in one of these cases,
Downes v. Bidwell, as follows:
"The power to acquire territory by treaty," [Brown] affirmed, "implies not only the
power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States
will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in what Chief Justice
Marshall termed the 'American Empire.' ... The Constitution applied to the terri-
tories only to the degree that it was extended to them by Congress.
22 7
Recall that in declaring their independence, American leaders exempted them-
selves from complying with international law by arguing a right under natural law to
free themselves from colonial tyranny and to establish a state that would more
221. See supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
222. PHILIPPINES READER, supra note 221, at 11 (quoting General William Shafter).
223. ZINN, supra note 170, at 308. See generally MILLER, supra note 207, at 196-252.
224. William McKinley, Proclamation of Dec. 21, 1898, microformed on CIS Presidential Executive
Orders and Proclamations: Part 1219, available athttp://www.mcs.edu.ph/centennial/benevolent.html.
225. See Organic (Foraker) Act of 1900, ch. 191, §§ 2-3, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (current version at 48 U.S.C.
§ 738-39 (2000)); Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The
Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIc SENSE: PUERTO
Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (Christina DufFy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds.,
2001).
226. See supra notes 156-168 and accompanying text.
227. Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction ofAmerican Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922),
65 REv. JUR. U.P.R 225,246-47 (1996) (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 280 (1901)).
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effectively implement the democratic and liberatory potential of Western civiliza-
tion.22 8 With the acquisition of "unincorporated territories,"2 2 9 the United States
now had to harmonize its stated principles and Constitutional guarantees not only
with its imposition of "domestic dependent nation" status on American Indians230
i.e., their maintenance as internal colonies-but also with its possession of external
colonies.23 1 In Downes v. Bidwell, Justice Brown addressed the concern that the
United States was deviating from its commitment to democratic governance and the
rule of law in acquiring explicitly colonial possessions.
First, with respect to the possibility of immediate incorporation, Brown noted that
"it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to the acquisition of territory upon the
condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions,
and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States. '232 He then
acknowledged the "apprehensions of danger... felt by many eminent men,-a
fear lest an unrestrained possession of power on the part of Congress may lead to
unjust and oppressive legislation in which the natural rights of territories, or their
inhabitants, may be engulfed in a centralized despotism. "233 Brown concluded that
such fears were unjustified, however, because "[t]here are certain principles of natural
justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in constitu-
tions or statutes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against legislation
manifestly hostile to their real interests."
234
Just as the colonial rationale for the acquisition of American Indian lands, articu-
lated by Justice Marshall, continues to undergird contemporary law governing fed-
eral relations with American Indian peoples,2 35 the logic of the Insular Cases is still
relied upon for the continued U.S. possession of Puerto Rico and its administration
of other "non-self-governing" territories. 236 These examples, I believe, illustrate the
basic continuity we find in expressions of American exceptionalism, not only with
respect to peoples subject to the plenary power of the United States but to general
228. See supra notes 127-147 and accompanying text.
229. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-42 (White, J., concurring) (explaining that only the inhabitants of a
territory which had been "incorporated" possessed constitutional rights, because "while in an international
sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was ... owned by the United States, it was foreign to the
United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been incorporated into the United States, but
was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession.").
230. Seesupra note 164.
231. See Ward Churchill, The Indigenous Peoples ofNorth America: A Struggle Against Internal Colonialism,
in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONI-
ZATION 15,24-26 (2002), on internal and settler-state colonialism.
232. 182 U.S. at 279-280. Justice Brown continued by summarizing the status granted the residents of
Louisiana, Florida, Mexico, and Alaska, and the terms of the treaty with Spain which allowed Congress to
decide the rights to be granted those living in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Id. at 280.
233. Id at 280.
234. Id see also Rivera Ramos, supra note 228, at 246-47.
235. See generally Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 431 (2005).
236. See NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER
AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 32-34 (2006). See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 226.
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U.S. policies and practices in the international arena.237 A few examples reflecting
this thesis are provided in the following section.
VI. MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FORDEMOCRACY IN THE 20 T CENTURY
[It bears remembering that history is an art form .... [Ilt can be colored in differ-
ent ways, and it is usually the winners who get to choose the colors. A history of the
United States can depict courageous men and women fighting for their freedom and
then struggling to make a life for themselves on an "unsettled" continent. It can tell of
the wisdom ofthe Founding Fathers-their belief that all men were created equal with
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-and their genius in devising a
government instituted among a free people to secure these ends .... It can tell of our
bravery and courage infighting two world wars to make the world safe for democracy. It
can.., recount the vision, ingenuity, and determination of those who made this nation
the richest and mostpowerful on earth ....
Or a history can be toldfrom a differentperspective.
Harold Southerland, The Case forAmerican History
in the Law-School Curriculum 
238
With the advent of the twentieth century, manifest destiny, the purported god-
given mission of the Anglo-Saxon race to literally supplant all other peoples, was
rebranded as "international cooperation" through which dominant colonial powers
would bring civilization and progress to "underdeveloped" nations. 239 Following
World War I, the League of Nations established a "mandate system" through which
the colonies of the defeated powers were placed under the tutelage of the victorious
European powers. However, in many respects this structure maintained colonial
relationships by requiring mandate territories to meet Eurocentric standards of
progress in order to be recognized as "civilized" states. 240 By placing imperial powers
in the role of ward or guardian of "less developed" territories, the League was relying
upon the legal theories articulated by Franciscus de Vitoria in the sixteenth century
to justify the colonization of indigenous peoples, and their more recent articulation
by Justice Marshall in the cases determining the status of American Indians.2 4 1
After the Second World War, the central mission of the League's mandate system
was adopted by the United Nations which, through its management of trust territo-
237. I have addressed the implications of these assertions of unrestricted political power in more detail in
SAITO, supra note 236.
238. Harold P. Southerland, The Case for American History in the Law-School Curriculum, 29 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 661,678-79 (2007).
239. Thus, Frederick Merk argues that manifest destiny as a justification for U.S. actions died at this point,
and was replaced by a more benign American "Mission." MERK, supra note 148, at 266. My belief is that it has
mutated, but is far from deadi
240. See ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 136-56. The United States was involved in establishing this system, but
ultimately chose not to participate in the League of Nations or its mandate system because of its failure to
guarantee a "open door policy" in all mandate territories. See id. at 143.
241. On the invocation of Vitoria, see id. at 145. On the Marshall cases, see supra notes 158-167 and
accompanying text.
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ries, attempted to transform colonies into independent states.2 42 Despite the stated
goal of extending the right to self-determination to all peoples, as Anghie and other
scholars have noted, "[t]he innovations and reforms of the U.N. period served in
important ways to reproduce and reinstate the inequalities and power disparities that
had characterized formal colonialism. ,243 This was accomplished, particularly in the
post-Cold War era, through the imposition of structures and agreements requiring
compliance with neo-liberal economic policies.244 Again, a comprehensive analysis
of this period is far beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is helpful to briefly
consider a few twentieth century deployments of American exceptionalism in our
efforts to juxtapose the policies and practices of early American history to the current
war on terror.
During this period, U.S. leaders promoted a vision consonant with that of the first
Puritan settlers.2 45 It was, perhaps, best articulated by Henry Luce in the 1940s:
"America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, America as
the training center of the skilled servants of mankind, America as the Good Samar-
itan.. . . and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Jus-
tice .... . 24 6 The most obvious invocation of this vision may be found in the twen-
tieth century refrain that American military power was being employed to "make the
world safe for democracy." From the United States' belated entry into World War I,
when the phrase was popularized,24 7 through Worlds War II, when it came to
emphasize the importance of defeating fascism, 248 many large and small-scale mili-
tary ventures were undertaken in the name of combating communism, ensuring
freedom, and promoting democracy.
2 49
This exceptionalist perspective was reflected by American officials who laid the
groundwork for the United States' military involvement in Southeast Asia,250 which
242. SeeANGHIE, supra note 13, at 196.
243. Id. at 199. See also Ediberto Romin & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and
Subjugation Under United States Expansion, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 437, 500-20 (2002), on the United States'
explicitly colonial endeavors in the post-World War II era. See generally Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto,
Democracy's Global Quest: A Noble Crusade Wrapped in Dirty Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 175
(2005); Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
903 (1997).
244. ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 223-44.
245. See id. at 416-22. See also CHOMSKY, supra note 175, at 9-19 (discussing ideological justifications of
the Cold War); CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS, supra note 32, at 63-79 (providing
chronological summary of U.S. military interventions since World War II).
246. KARNOW, supra note 22, at 14 (quoting.the famous magazine publisher Henry Luce, The American
Century, LIFE, Feb. 1941).
247. See id. at 13 (noting a "rhetoric of redemption" that "permeated" Woodrow Wilson's pledges).
248. See generally ZINN, supra note 170, at 398-408 (contrasting the U.S.' stated goals with many of its
actual policies).
249. For a chronology of such interventions, see CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS,
supra note 32, at 63-79.
250. On the economic interests involved, Howard Zinn quotes a 1952 secret National Security Council
memorandum stating that "Southeast Asia... is the principal world source of natural rubber and tin, and a
producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities .. " and a 1953 congressional study
which noted that "Indochina is immensely wealthy in rice, rubber, coal and iron ore. Its position makes it a
strategic key to the rest of Southeast Asia." ZINN, supra note 170, at 462.
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had many parallels to earlier U.S. wars to liberate and/or pacify other territories. 2 51
In assessing the war in Vietnam, Telford Taylor, chief counsel to the Nuremberg
prosecution, first noted "a deeply idealistic strain in the American interventionist
tradition," citing to McKinley's justifications for war against Spain.2 52 He suggested
that President Eisenhower, in the spirit of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Geno-
cide Convention, had pledged support to South Vietnam in 1954 in order to "'dis-
courage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.'
2 53
Nonetheless, even with this charitable framing of U.S. intent, Taylor was forced to
conclude by 1970 that if the United States' primary purpose remained the protection
of ideological freedom or the deterrence of aggression,
it is inconceivable that our conduct of military operations should have taken the
course that it has. Whatever peace-keeping and protective intentions may have
governed our initial involvement in Vietnam have by now been so completely
submerged under the avalanche of death and destruction that they no longer are
credible descriptions of the operation as a whole.
254
The Vietnam War was justified as an American effort to defend freedom in the
face of communist aggression, but the broader notion of bringing "civilization" to
Asia was never far behind.25 5 According to Orrin Schwab, by the time John Kennedy
was elected,
the 'Free World' was thought to be in daiger. The Soviets and their communist
allies pressed against the boundaries of freedom from the city of Berlin ... down
through the Balkans and the Turkish Dardanelles, and across the vast undeveloped
Afro-ASian heartland to the civil war in the Mekong Valley. The forces of freedom
were fighting for what the new president called the 'dignity of man' against the
palpable evil of international communism.2 56
251. There are striking parallels between U.S. wars of liberation and pacification in other territories and
the domestic pacification of American Indians, Filipinos, and Vietnamese, especially in the creation of
reservations or internment/concentration camps. See generally LYNN R. BAILEY, BOSQUE REDONDO: THE
NAVAJO INTERNMENT AT FORT SUMNER, NEW MExIcO, 1863-1868 (1982) (on American Indian intern-
ment); SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND THE
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 204-06 (1994) (comparing Indian reservations to
prison); MICHAEL LIEDER &JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED STATES
(1997). On the mass internments in the Philippines, see MILLER, supra note 207, at 163-64, 208 (discussing
mass internments in the Philippines). On Vietnamese internment, see D. MICHAEL SHAFER, DEADLY PARA-
DIGMS: THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY 268 (1988), and DOUGLAS S. BLAUFARB, THE
COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA: U.S. DOCTRINE AND PERFORMANCE 114-45 (1977) (on the "hamletization"
program in Vietnam).
252. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 186 (1970).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 187-88. See generally 1-4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard A. Falk, ed.,
1976), for analyses of the legality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.
255. See ZINN, supra note 170, at 465-67. See H. BRUCE FRANKLIN, VIETNAM AND OTHER AMERICAN
FANTASIES 27-41 (2000) (comparing "dominant fantasies of American people during Vietnam War and
reality of documented history").
256. ORRIN SCHWAB, DEFENDING THE FREE WORLD: JOHN F. KENNEDY, LYNDON JOHNSON, AND THE
VIETNAM WAR, 1961-1965 1 (1998).
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The "freedom" being brought to the Vietnamese was closely associated with civiliza-
tion. Stanley Karnow observes that Americans in Vietnam often "considered it their
duty to educate the 'natives'-just as, in their day, French administrators were
committed to the mission civilisatrice."257 When this mission met with staunch
resistance, a U.S. military officer in Vietnam would echo General Shafter's 1899
description of the war in the Philippines, explaining the devastation of the capitol of
Ben Tre province by saying, "It became necessary to destroy the town to save it." '2 58
This was, of course, a classic example of the same rhetoric used to justify colonial
ventures for at least five centuries.
As Neil Sheehan says about this era in U.S. history, "Americans perceived their
order as a new and benevolent form of international guidance... Washington wanted
native regimes that would act as surrogates for American power. The goal was to
achieve the sway over allies and dependencies which every imperial nation needs to
work its will in world affairs without the structure of old-fashioned colonialism.
259
While this approach was not particularly successfd in Vietnam, it has apparently
continued to undergird U.S. foreign policy, with its "benevolent" goals justifying
both the self-laudatory and self-exempting aspects of American exceptionalism.
Mary Ellen O'Connell states:
Officials in the Reagan Administration... applied this [exceptionalist] thinking
to international law on the use of force. The belief also appears in the Clinton
Administration policies ... regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and its right to use force without [U.N.] Security Council authorization.
American exceptionalism is fully evident on the part of those who proposed invad-
ing Iraq in the aftermath of September 1 1 th .... 260
As many scholars have noted, policies that serve to undermine fundamental rights
while nonetheless appearing to comply with international norms have frequently
been implemented through economic institutions such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, or the World Trade Organization, rather than through
explicitly military means. 26 1 In the realm of human rights, the United States has
claimed the prerogative to exempt itself from numerous international treaties and
257. KANOW, supra note 22, at 260.
258. FRANKLIN, supra note 256, at 95. For accounts of U.S. war crimes in Vietnam, see generally VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR
CRIMES (1972); BERTRAND RUSSELL, WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM (1967).
259. NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 131 (1988).
260. Mary Ellen O'Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense, 31 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43, 43 (2002) (citations omitted).
261. See ANGHIE, supra note 13, at 245-63. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter
Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 107 (1999) (arguing that the "good governance" requirements of the World Bank constrain the
implementation of human rights); Namita Wahi, Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World
Bank: A Critique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory. of Horizontal Accountability, 12 U. C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 331 (2006) (noting the coercive effect of such organizations on people in
"developing" countries). For related arguments concerning the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), see generally Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS
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implementing mechanisms, holding others to standards which it will not apply to its
own conduct, and often justifying this position by claiming to have a superior system
for ensuring such rights.26 2 In each of these arenas, U.S. officials have continued to
emphasize the importance of the global rule of law while often invoking a "higher
good" to exempt the United States from compliance with particular provisions of
international law.263
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
In waging the current war on terror, the United States government has taken the
position that the new and ever-changing threat of global terrorism justifies many
policies and practices that fail to comply with accepted norms of international law,
particularly those intended to restrain the use of force and ensure basic human rights.
U.S. representatives have noted the emergence of a "new paradigm" of international
law, and claim to be implementing a "distinctly American internationalism."2 64 This
new paradigm emphasizes the importance of the global rule of law, but presumes the
ability of the United States to exempt itself from international law at will. In the
war on terror, U.S. officials have characterized the opposition as "evil" embodied in
terrorists and rogue states. Much as early American leaders invoked the image of
the uncivilized savage to justify otherwise illegal actions against indigenous peoples,
U.S. officials now argue that established rules of warfare do not apply in the war on
terror because the enemy does not behave rationally. More generally, they portray
the United States as the preeminent representative of Western civilization, waging
war to preserve its most sacred values of freedom and democracy. In turn, these values are
posited as universally "right and true." Thus, while the United States appears to be
shunning norms and institutions established by the international community, it is
doing so for the higher purpose of extending the benefits of civilization to all.
Much of the debate surrounding U.S. actions since 2001 has accepted the premise
that we are collectively facing a new and distinctive threat and has focused on the
acceptability or effectiveness of the particular measures being taken to address that
threat. In this essay, I have noted some of the parallels between contemporary poli-
cies and practices and those of American settlers and political leaders throughout
U.S. history to highlight ways in which the justifications for American exceptional-
and Treaties ofAdhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 681 (2006); A. Samuel Oddi, TJPS-Natural Rights
anda "Polite Form ofEconomic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
262. See David Mednicoff, The Importance of Being Quasi-Democratic- The Domestication oflnternational
Human Rights in American andArab Politics, 38 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 317, 320-26 (2007); van der
Vyver, supra note 41, at 777-91.
263. In these cases, U.S. federal courts have, with relative consistency, refused to intervene to enforce
international law. See generally William E. Thro, American Exceptionalism: Some Thoughts on Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 219, 221-223 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court's rejection in
Sanchez-Llamas of the international community and its embrace of American Exceptionalism) and Judith
Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry,
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264. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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ism have remained remarkably consistent. In addition, I have argued that the ideologi-
cal foundation of this approach is rooted in the legal, political, and religious frame-
work upon which European colonialism was constructed, and that the United States
has both invoked and exempted itself from international legal standards since its
founding. Viewed from this perspective, I believe that we can develop accurate legal
analyses of, and effective responses to, contemporary U.S. practice only if we are
willing to consider current events in the context of our long history of American
exceptionalism.
This is a more difficult project than it might seem at first blush. First, we have the
problem of accessing accurate and multi-dimensional histories of how the United
States was established, its claimed territories consolidated, and its power extended.
These developments must then be placed in the context of the legal framework that
has both limited and legitimated them.2 65 If we wish to learn from and apply this
history, we will first have to excavate the continuities in both the theory and the
practice of American exceptionalism, and assess their implications. Such analyses, of
course, require clarification of the normative standards being applied. For some legal
scholars, the presumptions that undergird the worldview associated with Western
civilization may appear to be right, natural, or even inevitable. In that case, their
extension into contemporary policy should not be problematic. However, for those
of us intent on implementing the decolonization mandate of the post-World War II
era, the historical illustrations and arguments I have presented in this essay imply, I
believe, that we can neither effectively respond to contemporary legal developments
nor' fulfill that broader goal without questioning some of our most basic understand-
ings of American "values," as well as the fundamental presumptions about human
civilization and "progress" that buttress our legal structures.
265. See generally Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on US. Hegemony and the Latin
Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003) (discussing imperialist consequences of increasing
U.S. influence over international law); Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality ofInternational Law, 46 HARv.
INT'L L. J. (2005) (discussing imperial and anti-imperial tendencies operating within the international legal
system).
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Is the word "civilization," evoked by Bush in contemporary times, the direct
genealogical descendant of the mission civilatrice' evoked by his Anglo Saxon
predecessors to justify their onslaught on the native inhabitants of the land they
have chosen to settle and appropriate? Is the contemporary project by the current
political elites of the US to "spread democracy in the Middle East" the same as
and co-equal with the mission to civilize the "beast" in the lands where "beasts"
wandered two centuries ago? If the ethno/race of the old mission was Anglo Saxon,
what is its contemporary ethnic/race today? Does the election of Obama complicate
this question?
Perhaps to answer this question we first need to ask the following one: what is the
meaning of "the race of a mission"? Is it that the mission acquires the race of those
who launched it materially and discursively? Or is it that it acquires the race of
whoever benefits from its ill effect even if they were not its initiators, indeed came
long after it has been completed? Or is it the launching of the mission itself that
distributes color/ethnicity among those concerned, so they would not be identifiable
as a race even to themselves short of this mission? So that whether you agree or
disagree, benefit or lose, participate in the mission or not, the mission endows you
with color depending on which side of the dividing line you happen to fall? In
contemporary times, the debate on "spreading democracy in the Middle East" be-
tween the Democrats (we should not be in the business of spreading democracy in
other countries) and Republicans (yes, we should), the debate itself is a race distribu-
tor so that those "who own the democracy," whether they are for spreading it or not
are racially distinguished from/superior to those "who don't own it"? Perhaps race is
created and is continuously rejuvenated through the launching of missions: on crime
(black), on illegal immigration (Latino), on terrorism (Muslim)? Perhaps, mission is
the modus operandi of race. Or is it that we need to mix all of the above and argue
that a mission civilatrice is launched by a particular ethnic/racial group configuration
that is politically dominant but that marshals support for its mission (manufactures
consent) by inviting others to participate in a discourse that colors them in a way that
allows them to get a sense of superiority even though in fact they do not benefit, may
indeed lose (their lives) by the launching of the mission?
If this is so, when Obama declares he will not hesitate to bomb Pakistan "in
pursuit of terrorists" without consulting with the Pakistani government, how has the
race/color of the mission civilatrice or should I say disciplinaire, 2 come to be re-
aligned in the US?
* Lama Abu-Odeh is a Palestinian American Professor of Law at Georgetown Law. © 2009, Lama
Abu-Odeh.
1. French for "civilizing mission."
2. French for "disciplinary."
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In the aftermath of Barack Obama's truly historic victory in the U.S. presidential
election, the narrative of American progress and triumph is being enlarged and
emphasized by the mainstream national press. Current political discourse centers on
the notion that the United States has triumphed over its racial demons and restored
itself as a beacon of freedom and opportunity. The validity of this dominant framing
of the social trajectory of the United States body politic is called sharply into question
by Natsu Taylor Saito in her essay titled "Colonial Presumptions: The War on
Terror and the Roots of American Exceptionalism." Saito skillfully and convincingly
demonstrates that U.S. foreign policy in the War on Terror is not fundamentally
new, but is rather a contemporary manifestation of the "American worldview,"
which has been constant throughout the imperialist establishment and expansion of
the United States. Saito argues this "American worldview" constructs the United
States as the most advanced form of civilization in world history and is justified in
forcefully imposing this "civilization" upon others, exempting itself from legal norms
and obligations in the process.
Saito challenges legal scholars to seriously interrogate the fundamental American
worldview and the ways in which it manifests itself in contemporary American life.
The Obama presidency undoubtedly presents a unique and interesting opportunity
to assess the strength and staying power of American assumptions about 'civilization'
and "progress." The world possesses an arguably unprecedented level of hope that the
United States, under the leadership of Obama, can join the family of nations as an
equal partner rather than as a paternal dictator. Indeed, Obama promises to restore
America's image, comply with established international agreements, and engage in
dialogue with nations generally considered to be hostile towards the United States.
Such promises and rhetoric, along with the overwhelming global support they have
generated seem to indicate a humbling, if not complete overhaul, of the "American
worldview." However, scholars must remain attentive in the face of such lofty prom-
ises and jubilant celebration. They must be willing to continually seek out the ways
in which the American worldview both remains operative and is reshaped in the
"Obama era." The great hope inspired by Obama should be encouraging but should
not distract from the great task of elucidating and understanding the continuity of
American domination through time.In carrying out this great task scholars must acknowledge, as a central concern, the
physical reality faced by the millions of people displaced from the sphere of human
consideration, stripped of rights, denied dignity, and massacred in the course of
American business as usual. Such realities are too often abstracted and removed from
the sight and mind of those with the tools and privileges to change structural condi-
tions. There must be compassion for those, particularly working class people of
color, who are held to the 'strictest legal standards and punished within an ever
** David Peterson is a white, male doctoral student at the University of California, Irvine. His studies focus
on sociology, with a concentration in culture, globalization and socialization. © 2009, David Peterson.
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expanding imprisonment apparatus while political leaders at the highest levels of
power seem to view their legal agreements as worth little more than bathroom tissue.
This inequality reflects not merely an imperfect legal structure but rather reveals the
very function of law to mask the reality of lawlessness and raw power pursuit that
define elite power politics in world affairs under the guise of lawfulness and order.
Will the dehumanizing American worldview continue as a forceful undercurrent in
American cultural life or can citizens, equipped with an ever-increasing awareness of
historical domination and injustice, root out this cancer and replace it with a truly
humanizing orientation to others? The answer to this question will certainly depend
on the seriousness and vigilance with which scholars and citizens respond to Saito's
challenge to anchor understandings of and challenges to American practice within an
honest and critical historical framework.

